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The Shortsightedness of Blind Trusts 
Megan J. Ballard* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In June 2005, Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist directed the trustees 
of his familys thirteen trusts to sell all stock in HCAthe hospital 
company established by Frists father and brother, the nations largest 
hospital chain.1  This would have been an unremarkable event, except for 
the fact that all thirteen trusts were established as blind trusts for the 
benefit of Bill Frist and his immediate family members.2  This blindness 
theoretically meant the trustees kept the former Senator and his family in 
the dark about the identity and management of the assets held in trust. 
Policymakers enter government service owning assets and having 
private investment interests just like other people.  Policymakers private 
economic concerns may, however, present conflicts of interest with 
official decision-making.3  The Federal Ethics in Government Act 
                                                     
 *  Associate Professor, Gonzaga University School of Law.  I am grateful for very helpful 
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 1. Len Costa, A Wink and a Nod, LEGAL AFF., Jan.Feb. 2006, at 18, 18. 
 2. Id.  In addition, the timing of the sale was suspicious: the sale preceded a poor earnings 
report that caused the stock price to plummet by about nine percent in one day.  Id.  The Securities 
and Exchange Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice began an inquiry into the sale in 
September 2005 to investigate whether Frist improperly acted on any inside information.  Jeffrey H. 
Birnbaum & R. Jeffrey Smith, SEC, Justice Investigate Frists Sale of Stock, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 
2005, at A1.  Frist denied any wrongdoing, asserting that he ordered the stock divestiture to avoid 
conflicts of interest as he contemplated a 2008 bid for the presidency.  Carrie Johnson & Jeffrey H. 
Birnbaum, SEC Issues Subpoena to Frist, Sources Say, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2005, at A1. 
 3. There is no set definition of a conflict of interest.  A broad interpretation is that a conflict of 
interest arises if 1) a person is in a relationship with another individual or a group that requires the 
person to exercise judgment on behalf of the individual or group, and 2) the person has an interest 
that tends to interfere with the proper exercise of judgment in that relationship.  Michael Davis, 
Introduction to CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE PROFESSIONS 3, 8 (Michael Davis & Andrew Stark 
eds., 2001).  The Ethics Manual for the U.S. House of Representatives presents a more narrow 
definition, considering that the term denotes a situation in which an officials conduct of his office 
conflicts with his private economic affairs.  COMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, U.S. 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ETHICS MANUAL FOR MEMBERS, OFFICERS, AND EMPLOYEES OF THE 
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 87 (1992) [hereinafter HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL] (quoting ROBERT 
S. GETZ, CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS 3 (1966)).  The Ethics Manual continues: The ultimate concern, 
then, is risk of impairment of impartial judgment, a risk which arises whenever there is temptation 
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requires certain national policymakers and employees to publicly 
disclose their financial interests on an annual basis.4  Disclosing private 
economic matters allows the public to monitor potential financial 
conflicts of interest.  Such disclosure need not detail specific assets when 
a policymaker opts to transfer his financial interests into a blind trust.  
The blind trust, then, operates as an exception to complete financial 
disclosure while, at the same time, attempting to shield a policymaker 
from conflicts of interest.  Nonetheless, this shield functions properly 
only if the policymaker is actually blind to the identity and management 
of the assets once he has transferred them into the trust.5 
Frist was not blind to the assets in his blind trusts.  He received 
numerous updates from his trustees regarding the identity of certain trust 
assets, including the trusts hospital stock holdings.6  One trustee 
reported to the Senate that he told Frist in 2002 that HCA stock had been 
transferred into one of the trusts.7  Apparently, the trustee informed Frist 
on several occasions that HCA stock worth hundreds of thousands of 
dollars was placed into Frists blind trusts.8 
Despite this notification, Frist publicly claimed to have no 
knowledge of the assets in his familys blind trusts.  Frist asserted in a 
January 2003 television interview that he did not know how much HCA 
stock he owned, if any, because he had transferred his assets into a blind 
trust.9  He hid behind the blind trust shield to assuage the publics 
                                                                                                                       
to serve personal interests.  Id. (quoting JAMES C. KIRBY, JR., CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST 
39 (1970)).  Interestingly, the term conflict of interest appears to be a relatively recent invention of 
the latter half of the 20th century.  Blacks Law Dictionary did not include a definition of conflict 
of interest until 1979.  The Index of Legal Periodicals did not include a conflict of interest subject 
heading until 1967.  Davis, supra, at 17.  Nonetheless, the concept seems to have much earlier 
origins.  For example, the U.S. Constitution forbids federal officials from accepting gifts, 
employment, or titles from foreign governments.  Kathleen Clark, Regulating the Conflict of 
Interest of Government Officials, in CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE PROFESSIONS, supra, at 49, 49 
(citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8). 
 4. 5 U.S.C. app. § 102(a) (2000). 
 5. Investments a policymaker transfers into a new blind trust will not suddenly become 
unidentifiable to that public official.  Federal law attempts to address this problem.  See infra notes 
4243 and accompanying text. 
 6. Costa, supra note 1, at 19 (In a series of letters written to Frist between 2001 and 2005 and 
filed with the Senate Ethics Committee, the trustees informed him when HCA stock and other shares 
were purchased or sold on behalf of the trusts.). 
 7. Birnbaum & Smith, supra note 2.  The majority of the Frist familys blind trust assets were 
managed by M. Kirk Scobey, Jr., president of Equitable Trust Company of Tennessee.  David D. 
Kirkpatrick, Frist Sale of Hospital Stock Spurs Inquiries into Trusts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2005, at 
A8.  Northern Trust, a Chicago-based company, managed other trusts, all of which sold HCA stock.  
Id. 
 8. Birnbaum & Smith, supra note 2; see also supra note 6 (referring to letters that Frist 
received from his trustees). 
 9. Id. 
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concerns about potential conflicts of interest.10  Similarly, Frists 
financial disclosure reports for 2004 and 2005 assert that he did not know 
of the underlying assets in most of his blind trusts.11 
The former Senators hospital investments raise concern because he 
was directly involved in crafting legislation that affected the health care 
industry.12  Was his policymaking guided by the best interests of his 
constituents and the nation, or by his interest in furthering, or at least not 
hindering, the profitability of his familys hospital corporation?13 
More recently, presidential candidate and Senator Barack Obama 
attempted to establish a blind trust that turned out not to be blind to him, 
causing even more public unease over the effectiveness of blind trusts.  
In 2005, Senator Obama acquired stock in a biotechnology concern 
developing an avian flu treatment, and then introduced a bill urging more 
research on avian flu drugs.14  Obama claimed that his broker purchased 
the stock pursuant to a blind trust agreement that had not yet been 
finalized, and that he did not learn of this investment until months later.15 
As a conflict avoidance measure, the blind trust seeks to strike a 
balance between two competing public interests.  We want to encourage 
qualified individuals to participate in government service.  At the same 
time, however, we need to ensure that government decisions are not 
                                                     
 10. Larry Margasak, Documents Show Frist Keeping an Eye on His Blind Trust; SEC 
Investigating Sale of Hospital Stock, COLUMBIAN, Sept. 25, 2005, at A6 (quoting Frist as having 
asserted: Well, I think really for our viewers it should be understood that I put this into a blind trust.  
So far as I know, I own no HCA stock).  Two weeks before this interview, a trustee for the majority 
of the Frist familys blind trusts informed Frist that one of his blind trusts had acquired HCA stock 
valued between $15,000 and $50,000.  Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Letters Show Frist Notified of Stocks in 
Blind Trusts, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2005, at A1. 
 11. In both years, Frist did list assets in one blind trust.  The assets appear to be mostly real 
estate holdings; none is hospital corporation stock.  William H. Frist, United States Senate Financial 
Disclosure Report for Annual and Termination Reports (May 15, 2006), available at http://www. 
opensecrets.org/pfds/pfd2005/N00003147_2005.pdf; William H. Frist, United States Senate 
Financial Disclosure Report for Annual and Termination Reports (May 16, 2005), available at http:// 
www.opensecrets.org/pfd2004/NOOOO3147_2004.pdf. 
 12. Frist served in the U.S. Senate from January 1995 to January 2007.  He singled out health 
care as a special concern during these years of service.  Sheryl Gay Stolberg, For Frist, a Political 
Fortune May Be Inextricably Linked to a Financial One, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2005, at A19.  In 
1995, Frist supported a bill that increased Medicare reimbursements to for-profit hospitals, such as 
those owned by HCA.  Id.  Frist participated in 1997 on a bipartisan commission to recommend 
changes to Medicare.  Id.  Frist also played a key role in amending Medicare in 2003 by adding a 
voluntary prescription drug benefit.  Id. 
 13. Frist maintains he did nothing wrong regarding his blind trusts.  He stated that he consulted 
with outside counsel and Senate Ethics Committee staff before selling HCA shares.  Costa, supra 
note 1, at 19.  Indeed, the Senate Select Committee on Ethics absolved Senator Frist of any 
wrongdoing in relation to his blind trusts.  Stolberg, supra note 12, at A19. 
 14. Mike McIntire & Christopher Drew, Obama, in Brief Investing Foray in 05, Took Same 
Path as Donors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2007, at A1. 
 15. Id. 
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tainted by a policymakers own financial interests.16  Valuing the latter 
concern can impair the former and vice versa.  In other words, 
constructing absolute protections against financial conflicts of interest 
might mean complete disclosure of financial matters and divestiture of 
troublesome investments.  Such limited options might discourage 
individuals from considering government employment.  Blind trusts 
theoretically allow both interests to coexist peacefully.  A critical 
evaluation of federal law regulating blind trusts, however, reveals that 
the use of blind trusts may err on the side of encouraging service to the 
public detriment of allowing policymakers actions to be influenced by 
private financial concerns. 
Exploration of the value of the blind trust vehicle in the public 
sphere merits immediate attention for a number of reasons.  
Disconcerting news reports regarding Senator Frists and Senator 
Obamas blind trust investments undermine public confidence that these 
devices can prevent or deter financial conflicts of interest.17  At the same 
time, blind trusts are increasingly being touted as a solution to conflicts 
                                                     
 16. These competing public policy interests are not novel.  They played a part in congressional 
debates over enacting conflict of interest legislation in 1962.  The Senate report on the proposed 
legislation commented on then-existing ethics statutes that created wholly unnecessary obstacles to 
recruiting qualified people for government service.  S. REP. NO. 87-2213 (1962), reprinted in 1962 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3852, 3854.  President-elect Carter apparently had these same public policy interests 
in mind.  The ethics guidelines released by Carters transition group before his inauguration 
recognized that [t]o decree that no person can have any financial interests other than a salary from 
the Government would seriously limit the ability to recruit the most qualified persons.  Texts of 
Carter Statement on Conflicts of Interest and Ethics; Appointees Guidelines, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 
1977, at A17. 
 17. Recent convictions of White House and congressional policymakers found to have used 
their power for personal gain further underscore the need to examine how to deter government 
officials from making decisions influenced by private financial interests.  Representative Bob Ney 
agreed in September 2006 to plead guilty to charges related to gifts he received from lobbyist Jack 
Abramoff, after having denied that official actions previously taken on behalf of Abramoff were 
related to the gifts.  Philip Shenon, Ohio Congressman Is Said to Agree to Plead Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 15, 2006, at A14.  A former White House budget official was convicted in June 2006 after 
lying to federal investigators about providing private assistance to Abramoff, his former lobbying 
partner.  Philip Shenon, Man Linked to Abramoff Is Sentenced to 18 Months, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 
2006, at A9.  A former top aide to Representative Tom DeLay pleaded guilty in March 2006 to 
corruption charges stemming from his receipt of thousands of dollars in illegal gifts in exchange for 
influencing legislation.  Philip Shenon, Ex-DeLay Aide Pleads Guilty in Lobby Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 1, 2006, at A1.  Representative Randy Cunningham pleaded guilty in November 2005, after 
acknowledging acceptance of at least $2.4 million in bribes, including hundreds of thousands of 
dollars in cash and other gifts from two military contractors while helping them win Pentagon 
contracts.  John M. Broder & Carl Hulse, Republicans Denounce Ex-Lawmaker, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
30, 2005, at A29.  Congress responded to concerns prompted by these convictions by enacting the 
Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-81, 121 Stat. 735 available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_public_laws&docid=f:pub 
l081.110.pdf (strengthening the disclosure requirements and enforcement of lobbying laws, among 
other purposes). 
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of interest in the private sector, particularly given the nature of 
executive compensation, the business insiders need to diversify and 
manage portfolio risk, the critical focus on corporate governance, and 
increased regulation.18  While private use of these devices is on the rise, 
there is no universal definition of a blind trust or established rules for 
its operation.19  Similarly, some state legislatures have authorized the use 
of blind trusts by certain state officials as an alternative to financial 
disclosure.20  These state blind trust rules are no more uniform than those 
for private blind trusts.  Public unease over the effectiveness of federal 
blind trust rules, as well as the possibility that federal law may set a 
benchmark for private or state blind trusts, indicates a need to closely 
scrutinize the current federal statutory scheme. 
This Article examines the blind trust, as presently authorized by 
federal law, and argues that the device does not provide sufficient 
protection against financial conflicts of interest for policymakers.21  The 
                                                     
 18. Edmond M. Ianni, Blind Trusts Offer Clients Customized Wealth Planning, 30 EST. PLAN. 
319, 322 (2003).  The Securities and Exchange Commission rule 10b5-1 (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 
(2006)), which took effect in October 2000, allows executives to delegate the purchase or sale of 
shares in their own companies stocks to a third party.  Eric Schellhorn, A New Take on the Blind 
Trust, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 14, 2002, at 20.  Yahoo!, Inc. co-founder Jerry Yang 
established a blind trust under Rule 10b5-1 to trade Yahoo! stock.  Yahoo! Inc. Current Report 
(Form 8-K) (June 10, 2002); Edmond M. Ianni, Remove Temptation, TR. & EST., June 2003, at 42, 
45 [hereinafter Temptation]. 
 19. Temptation, supra note 18, at 43. 
 20. See, e.g., Act of July 9, 2007, ch. 47, sec. 57, § 39.50.040, 2007 Alaska Adv. Legis. Serv. 
47 (LexisNexis); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 18235(a) (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-79(a), 1-
83 (West Supp. 2007); MD. CODE REGS. 19A.06.01.0103 (2007).  This Article does not thoroughly 
explore and analyze state blind trust rules, but it does draw on some features of different state rules 
to suggest amendments to federal legislation. 
 21. This Article does not address whether judges should be allowed to employ blind trusts as a 
means of avoiding financial disclosure.  While federal judges and magistrates must adhere to the 
Ethics in Government Acts financial disclosure mandates, they are prohibited from using blind 
trusts as an exception to disclosure.  Pub. L. No. 93-512, § 455, 88 Stat. 1609, 1609 (1974) (codified 
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 455) (requiring federal judges and magistrates to disqualify themselves in 
any proceedings in which their impartiality might reasonably be questioned).  The amendment 
makes the statutory disqualification rules conform to the Code of Judicial Conduct rules regarding 
disqualification, which the Judicial Conference adopted in 1973.  H.R. REP. NO. 93-1453 (1974), 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 635253.  The House Judiciary Committee Report on this 
legislation unambiguously states that a judges duty to inform himself about his financial interests 
precludes use of a so-called blind trust.  Id. at 6356.  Ironically, the Committee reasoned that a 
blind trust is not blind because the judge would still have to report profit, loss or earnings from the 
trust property on his income tax report.  Id.  Members of Congress and executive branch officials 
also must report this data on their tax returns, yet a blind trust is still considered to be a sufficient 
conflict of interest shield for them.  See infra note 41 and accompanying text (statute authorizes a 
trustee to communicate information about a blind trust that will allow the policymaker to complete 
an income tax return).  Congress specifically requires judges to be informed of their financial 
interests.  A federal judge or magistrate must inform himself about his personal and fiduciary 
financial interests.  28 U.S.C. § 455(c) (2000).  Whether judges should be allowed to rely on blind 
trusts is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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weaknesses of blind trusts result in two related injuries.  First, because 
the rules for these trusts do not include sufficient incentives to maintain 
blindness, they may fail to prevent conflicts of interest.  Policymakers 
knowledgeable about the financial assets they hold in a blind trust are in 
a position to make decisions influenced by a personal stake in the matter.  
Second, blind trusts can mislead the public into believing that 
policymakers are avoiding conflicts, when they may not be doing so.22  
Blind trusts that are not truly blind to a policymaker tend to disguise 
actual or apparent conflicts of interest from public oversight.  In this 
sense, blind trusts undermine the transparency essential to democratic 
governance. 
To explore the deficiencies of blind trusts, Part II of this Article 
discusses the current use and legislative parameters of the qualified 
blind trust established under the 1978 Ethics in Government Act.  This 
part also briefly reviews events that led to the codification of blind trust 
rules, underscoring that some of the problems initially prompting the 
legislation continue to exist today. 
Part III describes how a private trust is used as an asset-management 
device, and analyzes the ways in which this traditional trust differs from 
a blind trust.  Under a traditional trust, an outside trustee can effectively 
manage assets for a beneficiary because the beneficiarys self-interest 
motivates him to monitor the trustees performance.23  A trustees 
fiduciary obligation facilitates this oversight because a trustee must keep 
the beneficiary informed about the trust assets.  Under a qualified blind 
trust, however, the beneficiary must be kept in the dark about his assets, 
contrary to his immediate self-interest.  This fundamental difference 
gives rise to many of the flaws of blind trusts.  Part III also discusses 
legislative attempts to compensate for a beneficiarys inability to act on 
his self-interest and oversee the trustees performance.  Finally, Part III 
maintains that these statutory efforts fail largely because there is no one 
else monitoring the trustee.  This failure means that beneficiaries have a  
 
                                                     
 22. Senator Frist is not the only public official to claim a blind trust absolves him completely of 
any potential conflict of interest, despite knowledge of the initial assets.  Then Representative 
Thomas J. Bliley, Jr., criticized for potential conflicts between his role as chairman of the House 
Commerce Committee and his investment portfolio, responded by vowing to create a blind trust.  He 
claimed that [o]nce the trust is created, I will not know what I own, so that no one can claim that 
my decisions are based on my own self-interest.  David S. Cloud, Bliley Investments Go to Blind 
Trust, 53 CONG. Q. 1613 (1995). 
 23. To the extent the trust is established for the benefit of a minor child or incompetent adult, a 
parent, guardian, or conservator usually will be responsible for protecting the beneficiarys interests.  
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 303 (2000) (amended 2005). 
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strong incentive to ignore the statutory restrictions on communicating 
with trustees. 
Part IV presents proposals to address the flaws of blind trusts.  It 
begins by recommending that the device should not be used as an 
exception to financial disclosure.  Because blind trusts are ineffective as 
a means of avoiding conflicts of interest, a choice must be made between 
encouraging a broader pool of possible public servants and protecting the 
integrity of government decisions.  Public policy should place a higher 
value on preserving the decision-making process.  Government decision-
makers should fully disclose their financial affairs.  Where a financial 
conflict of interest arises, a public official should refrain from decision-
making or divest himself of the asset.  While this Part addresses the 
advantages of complete financial disclosure, it also recognizes problems 
inherent in this approach.  Given that Congress has already rejected 
disclosure coupled with abstention as a solution, Part IV concludes with 
proposals for amending the statute governing qualified blind trusts in 
ways that will, among other things, help to ensure a trustee is adequately 
monitored so that a public official has less incentive to remove the 
blindfold by seeking prohibited information regarding trust assets. 
II. CURRENT BLIND TRUST RULES 
A. Qualified Blind Trusts Under the Ethics in Government Act 
The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 formally established the 
qualified blind trust as an optional mechanism for circumventing full 
disclosure of financial interests while at the same time avoiding conflicts 
with official duties.24  Until this enactment, there was no authoritative 
consensus as to what elements constituted a proper blind trust.25  To 
understand the role of blind trusts, it is useful first to review the financial 
disclosure mandate of the Ethics in Government Act and earlier conflict 
of interest legislation governing the executive branch. 
The Ethics in Government Act, as amended, requires certain 
employees and officials from all three branches of government to submit 
financial disclosure statements accessible to the public.26  The purpose of 
                                                     
 24. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824. 
 25. Office of Government Ethics, Advisory Opinion 86 x 12 (Sept. 8, 1986), available at http:// 
www.usoge.gov/pages/advisory_opinions/advop_files/1986/86x12.pdf. 
 26. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101102 (2000).  Before this enactment, public officials were required to 
disclose their financial interests, but these disclosures were not made public.  Public Officials 
Integrity Act of 1977, Blind Trusts and Other Conflict of Interest Matters: Hearings on S. 555 Before 
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disclosing financial interests is to facilitate public monitoring of, and to 
deter, conflicts of interest.27  Persons who must report include the 
President, the Vice President, high-level executive branch employees, 
administrative law judges, members of Congress, high-level 
congressional officers and employees, federal judges, and federal judicial 
employees authorized to perform adjudicatory functions (collectively 
referred to as reporting individuals).28  At least annually, each 
reporting individual must disclose the source, type, and amount of 
income he received,29 as well as the identity and general value of the 
property he owns.30  For example, if a reporting individual owns Acme 
stock worth $95,000, and earns dividends of $4000 during a calendar 
year, that persons annual financial disclosure report must list the name 
of the corporation issuing the stock, mark the value of the asset as falling 
in the $50,000 to $100,000 category, and list dividends in the category of 
greater than $2500 but not more than $5000.31  This disclosure 
obligation extends to the financial interests of the reporting individuals 
spouse and dependent children.32 
Financial disclosure obligations may require these same steps even if 
the Acme stock is held in a traditional trust that benefits the reporting 
individual.  In general, the identity and value category of the underlying 
assets held by a traditional trust must be disclosed if the reporting 
individual has a beneficial interest in the trust.33  However, the 
underlying assets of a trust need not be disclosed if they are held in a 
qualified blind trust.34 
                                                                                                                       
the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong. 7 (1977) (statement of President Carter to 
Congress proposing the Ethics in Government Act of 1977). 
 27. HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 3, at 157. 
 28. 5 U.S.C. app. § 101(f)(1)(12) (2000).  Officers and employees are required to report if 
they are in a position classified above GS-15 of the General Schedule, or earn pay equal to or greater 
than 120 percent of the minimum rate of basic pay payable for GS-15 of the General Schedule.  Id. 
§§ 101(f)(3), 101(f)(6), 109(13). 
 29. Id. § 102(a)(1).  Reporting individuals must disclose the actual amount of earned income, 
other than income earned from current employment with the U.S. government.  Id. § 102(a)(1)(A).  
In addition, reporting individuals must indicate a general value category of income from publicly 
traded and non-publicly traded assets and unearned income sources.  See id. § 102(a)(1)(B) 
(requiring the reporting of dividends, rents, interest, and capital gains). 
 30. Id. § 102(a)(3). 
 31. Id. § 102(a)(1)(B)(iii).  Dividends and income must be reported when they accrue, even if 
dividends are automatically reinvested.  U.S. OFFICE OF GOVT ETHICS, PUBLIC FINANCIAL 
DISCLOSURE: A REVIEWERS REFERENCE 8-10 (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter REVIEWERS REFERENCE]. 
 32. 5 U.S.C. app. § 102(e)(1).  Subsequent discussion of rules governing reporting individuals 
also applies to spouses and dependent children without specifically referencing these family 
members. 
 33. REVIEWERS REFERENCE, supra note 31, at 7-27. 
 34. 5 U.S.C. app. § 102(f)(2)(A).  The Ethics in Government Act also provides exceptions to 
financial disclosure for limited types of trusts and for assets held in a widely held investment fund.  
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A reporting individual who chooses to transfer assets into a qualified 
blind trust need not separate out on a financial disclosure report the exact 
assets held by the trust.  For example, if the qualified blind trust holds 
Acme stock, the financial disclosure report would not name the Acme 
Corporation, but would include only the name of the trust.  The reporting 
individual must also identify the trust as a qualified blind trust, report the 
value range of the individuals interest in the trust, and report the value 
range of income that the individual received from the trust.  While 
reporting individuals are not required to establish blind trusts, they are an 
attractive alternative to disclosure for some public policymakers. 
In addition to the specific financial disclosure requirements that the 
Ethics in Government Act imposes on certain officials from all three 
branches of government, separate legislation imposes liability on 
executive branch employees related to financial conflicts of interest.  
Any employee of the executive branch who participates in a decision, on 
a matter in which, to his knowledge, he has a financial interest, is 
subject to civil and criminal liability.35  Blind trusts also provide an 
exception to this general conflict of interest legislation.  Holdings in a 
blind trust are not considered to be a financial interest for purposes of 
this conflict of interest statute.36 
So far, this section has described how a qualified blind trust limits 
both financial disclosure obligations, and the applicability of penalties 
for an executive branch employees conflict of interest.  The remainder 
addresses restrictions imposed on communication between a trustee and 
a beneficiary, as well as limitations on who may serve as a trustee.  
These are the provisions that attempt to render a trust blind to the 
beneficiary. 
The qualified blind trust rules limit communication between a trustee 
and an interested partya reporting individual or the individuals 
                                                                                                                       
A reporting individual need not report the underlying assets of a trust when the reporting individual 
did not establish the trust, and neither the reporting individual nor his spouse or dependent children 
know what is contained in the trust.  Id. § 102(f)(2)(B).  Examples of widely held investment funds 
include a mutual fund, a regulated investment company, and a pension or deferred compensation 
plan.  Id. § 102(f)(8).  To qualify for this investment fund exception, such funds must not be 
controlled by the reporting individual and must be publicly traded or widely diversified.  Id. § 
102(f)(8)(A), (B). 
 35. 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) (2000).  The current statutory prohibition stemmed from alleged civil 
war era abuses likely involving government officials making decisions about matters in which they 
had a personal interest. BAYLESS MANNING, FEDERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAW 110 (1964).  
Section 208, enacted in 1963, is a direct lineal descendant of the former § 434.  Id. at 109.  Section 
434, enacted in 1958, was in turn based substantially on an 1863 amendment to an 1862 act.  Id. at 
app. A, 27476, 28081. 
 36. 5 C.F.R. § 2634.401(a)(1)(ii) (2007). 
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spouse and dependent children.37  In managing the assets, a trustee shall 
not consult or notify any interested party.38  With few exceptions, the 
trustee may not provide any specific information on the trust assets or 
sources of income, and communication between any interested party and 
the trustee is limited.39 
There are three general types of authorized communication.  First, a 
trustee and interested party may communicate in writing about the 
general financial interest and needs of the interested party, a direction 
to the trustee to sell all of an asset initially placed in the trust if it poses 
an actual or apparent conflict of interest, or notification of a law or 
regulation that prohibits the interested party from holding an asset.40  
Second, a trustee may provide quarterly reports to an interested party 
regarding the total value of that partys interest in the trust, the net 
income or loss of the trust, any information necessary to enable an 
interested party to complete an individual tax return, and information that 
will allow a reporting individual to complete a financial disclosure 
report.41  Third, a trustee must notify the interested party when an asset 
initially placed in the trust is transferred out of the trust.42  When a public 
official first establishes a qualified blind trust, it cannot actually be 
blind.  By virtue of the newness of the trust, the official knows what 
assets he transferred into it until a trustee notifies him that the trust no 
longer holds the asset.  There is a limited statutory exception that allows 
a well-diversified portfolio placed in trust to be truly blind from its 
inception. 43  Absent this exception, or notice from a trustee, a public 
official must treat those assets as reportable financial interests.44  
Nonetheless, there appears to be no requirement that the reporting 
                                                     
 37. 5 U.S.C. app. § 102(f)(3)(E) (2000) (defining interested party for purposes of qualified 
blind trusts as a reporting individual, his spouse, and any other minor or dependent child). 
 38. Id. § 102(f)(3)(C)(i). 
 39. Id. § 102(f)(3)(C)(v). 
 40. Id. § 102(f)(3)(C)(vi). 
 41. Id. § 102(f)(3)(C)(v). 
 42. Id. § 102(f)(3)(C)(iii). 
 43. A blind trust that is established with only a well-diversified portfolio of readily marketable 
securities that do not consist of securities of entities having substantial activities in the area of the 
reporting individuals primary area of responsibility is considered completely blind from its 
inception.  Id. § 102(f)(4)(B)(i).  Accordingly, the reporting individual need not consider the initial 
assets to be financial interests for the purposes of § 102(f)(4)(A).  Id. § 102(f)(4)(B)(i). Regulations 
governing executive branch blind trusts refer to blind trusts established with diversified assets as 
Qualified Diversified Trusts.  5 C.F.R. §§ 2634.401(a)(1)(iii), 2634.404 (2007). 
 44. 5 U.S.C. app. § 102(f)(4)(A) (2000).  Treating the initial assets as a financial interest of the 
official means that the official will be subject to conflict of interest statutes, including 18 U.S.C. § 
208 (prohibiting executive branch and independent agency officers and employees from taking 
government action while having a conflicting financial interest). 
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individual separately list these initial assets on a public financial 
disclosure form each year until the time the trustee provides notice that 
the asset has been transferred from the trust.45 
To facilitate blindness, a trustee must be independent from any 
interested party.  To be independent, a trustee cannot be associated with 
an interested party; cannot be, or previously have been, an employee of 
or affiliated with an interested party; nor can a trustee be a relative of an 
interested party.46 
Adherence to these provisions limiting communication and who may 
serve as trustees is monitored by three different supervising ethics 
offices, one in each of the U.S. House of Representatives, the Senate, and 
the executive branch.47 
B. Qualified Blind Trust Antecedents 
The Ethics in Government Acts standardization of the elements and 
operation of blind trusts sprang from a history of sporadic and informal 
blind trust use among public officials.  Briefly reviewing the history of 
government officials use of blind trusts reveals that some of the 
problems prompting federal legislation have not been solved by the 
advent of qualified blind trusts.  Specifically, early use of blind trusts 
may have originated from a desire to give the public appearance that a 
policymaker was avoiding conflicts of interest without actually blinding 
the policymaker to an asset that stood to influence the execution of 
official duties.  Legislation establishing qualified blind trust rules has not 
solved this problem. 
                                                     
 45. Telephone conversation with Katja Eichinger, Counsel, Senate Select Comm. on Ethics 
(Feb. 23, 2007).  Because the initial assets are listed in the trust document itself, a public record, 
there is no obligation to report these assets on a public financial disclosure report annually.  See also 
discussion infra notes 14749 and accompanying text.  Senator Frist, for example, knew that his 
blind trusts held HCA stock, yet he did not list these assets as belonging to the trust on his public 
financial disclosure statement.  See supra notes 611 and accompanying text. 
 46. 5 U.S.C. app. § 102 (f)(3)(A)(i)(I)(III) (2000). 
 47. Executive branch qualified blind trusts are monitored by the Office of Government Ethics.  
5 U.S.C. app. § 109(18)(D).  The office was established by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.  
Id. § 401(a).  Particular agencies, however, have individual administrative offices in charge of 
monitoring compliance with the financial disclosure mandate of the Ethics in Government Act 
within the agency.  See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-90-51, GOVERNMENT 
ETHICS: HUD FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORTS MISSING OR NOT REVIEWED (1990) (criticizing the 
Department of Housing and Urban Developments system for obtaining and reviewing financial 
disclosure statements).  The legislative branch is monitored separately because the Constitution 
allows Congress exclusive authority to regulate itself.  Costa, supra note 1, at 19.  The House 
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct oversees qualified blind trusts for U.S. Representatives 
and House officers and employees.  5 U.S.C. § 109(18)(B).  The Senate Select Committee on Ethics 
monitors qualified blind trusts Senators and Senate officers and employees.  Id. § 109(18)(A). 
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President Lyndon B. Johnson appears to have been the first elected 
U.S. official to use a blind trust.48  Nevertheless, Johnson knew about 
significant holdings in the trust.49  When Johnson took office as Vice 
President in 1963, his familys ownership of a radio and television 
station in Texas deepened conflict of interest concerns that had followed 
him for nearly two decades.  These concerns first arose when Johnson 
purchased a radio station while serving in the U.S. House of 
Representatives, then applied for a Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) license to construct a television station while 
serving as a U.S. Senator.50  Johnson claimed he had not lobbied the FCC 
or cast a vote to further his media interests, but his political position 
likely played a role in securing favorable FCC decisions that helped his 
media holdings grow.51 
Upon Johnsons ascent to the vice presidency, his staff encouraged 
him to sell his radio and television assets.  He and his family were 
reluctant to do so.  Instead, the Johnsons created a blind trust naming 
two business associates and family friends as the trustees and giving 
them complete discretion.52  While the trust provisions governing 
blindness are not known, the lawyer who drafted the trust reported that 
he was unaware of any agreement between the Johnsons and the trustees 
not to sell shares of the media holdings.53  Given that one of his trustees 
                                                     
 48. Costa, supra note 1, at 18. 
 49. The blind trust was likely created during the Kennedy Administration to help several 
cabinet undersecretaries avoid conflicts of interest.  Id.  (reporting that Sheldon Cohen, a tax partner 
at the law firm of Arnold, Fortas & Porter, was asked to find a solution to the Kennedy cabinet 
officials potential conflicts).  Within months of Kennedys taking office, Congress passed 
significant conflict of interest legislation governing the executive branch.  Bribery, Graft, and 
Conflicts of Interest, Pub. L. No. 87-849, 76 Stat. 1119 (1962) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 
208 (2000)).  While the legislation itself did not specifically mention blind trusts, its prohibitions 
lent themselves well to the creation of blind trusts.  The statute continues to prohibit certain 
executive branch employees from participating in a matter in which the employee or those close to 
the employee have a known financial interest.  See 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) (2000) (prohibiting 
participation when the employee knows of financial interests of a spouse; minor child; general 
partner; organization in which the employee serves as an officer, director, trustee, general partner or 
employee; or any person or organization with whom the employee is negotiating or has any 
arrangement concerning prospective employment).  See also supra notes 3536, and accompanying 
text. 
 50. Costa, supra note 1, at 18; see also  ROBERT DALLEK, LYNDON B. JOHNSON: PORTRAIT OF 
A PRESIDENT 52 (2004) (discussing the Johnsons decision to purchase radio station KTBC and 
commenting that Johnsons involvement in a business that largely depended on the actions of a 
Federal agency for its success created a clear conflict between his private interests and public 
position). 
 51. DALLEK, supra note 50, at 7677. 
 52. Costa, supra note 1, at 1819; ROBERT DALLEK, FLAWED GIANT: LYNDON JOHNSON AND 
HIS TIMES, 19611973, at 611 (1998). 
 53. Costa, supra note 1, at 19. 
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was the executive director of the Johnsons broadcasting stations, 
Johnson must have had some degree of comfort that the trustees would 
not sell his interests.54  Indeed, Johnson continued to own his radio and 
television properties when he left office in 1969.55 
Guidelines on how to structure and use blind trusts emerged slowly 
on the federal level.  Interestingly, these initial guidelines were more 
restrictive of the types of assets appropriate for a blind trust than is 
current federal law.  The U.S. Department of the Interior, in 1975, may 
have been the first federal agency to formulate standards relating to blind 
trusts.56  These standards required a trustee to divest holdings that created 
conflicts of interest, and prohibited the trustee from acquiring assets that 
might create a conflict of interest.57 
In January 1977, President-elect Carter issued ethics guidelines in 
the aftermath of the Watergate scandal.58  Carters transition team 
proposed voluntary blind trusts for Carter appointees as an alternative to 
divestiture.59  While Carters guidelines limited blind trusts to cash or 
diversified assets, Carter himself placed his interests in two family-
owned businesses into a trust that incorporated blind trust features.60  
Because Carters trust prevented trustees from selling his share of a 
family farm, Carter continued to know of his ownership interest in that 
business. 
                                                     
 54. Johnsons trustees were Donald S. Thomas, an Austin attorney and business associate, and 
Jesse Kellam, the executive director of the broadcasting stations that the Johnsons owned.  DALLEK, 
supra note 52. 
 55. Id.  Ironically, Johnson championed openness in government.  In 1966, Johnson signed the 
Freedom of Information Act into law, stating: This legislation springs from one of our most 
essential principles: a democracy works best when the people have all the information that the 
security of the Nation permits.  Carolyn Bingham Kello, Drawing the Curtain on Open 
Government?  In Defense of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 345, 346 n.7 
(citing Steven Goldberg, Freedom Paper No. 6: Public Access to Government Information, http:// 
usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/archive/freedom/freedom6.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2003)). 
 56. S. REP. NO. 95-639, at 3 (1978) [hereinafter SENATE BLIND TRUST REPORT]. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. (citing Texts of Carter Statement on Conflicts of Interest and Ethics; Appointees 
Guidelines, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1977, at A17). 
 59. Texts of Carter Statement on Conflicts of Interest and Ethics; Appointees Guidelines, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 5, 1977, at A17. 
 60. Id.  Carter transferred his interest in Carters Warehouse and Carter Farms, Inc. to a trust 
that he may not have labeled a blind trust, but that limited information he could receive from his 
trustee.  No reports will be made to Jimmy Carter from the trustee or any investment advisors other 
than minimum tax information and an annual statement of the net value of the trust.  Id.  The trust 
agreement specified that the trust would retain Carters interest in the farm, but would rent it for an 
annual fixed amount.  Carter was to receive income from this interest not to exceed the amount 
established during 1977, to ensure that he and his family would not be affected from profits or losses 
of farm operations.  Carters partnership interest in Carters Warehouse was to be either leased for 
four years for a fixed amount, or sold, at the discretion of the trustee.  Id. 
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While both Presidents Johnson and Carter knew of the assets they 
held in trust, they may have been kept in the dark about management 
decisions.  However, in most cases, blind management of sighted assets 
does not go far enough to foreclose the possibility that decisions could be 
tainted by a policymakers interest in protecting known investments.  
Johnson, for example, may not have known of his radio and television 
stations contractual commitments, but he did know that the health of his 
investments depended on FCC determinations and he was in a position in 
Congress and the White House to influence the FCC.  Similarly, Carter 
stood to affect farm policy knowing of his familys agricultural interests, 
despite the fact that he may not have been involved in day-to-day 
decisions regarding his family farm. 
Within months of the release of Carters ethics guidelines, the Senate 
amended its Standing Rules to require dissolution of blind trusts existing 
in the Senate.  The resolution established, as the sense of the Senate, that 
blind trusts should be either dissolved or modified to permit disclosure 
unless the Senate could establish a rule, or Congress pass legislation, that 
mandated minimum requirements and standards for blind trusts.61  In 
other words, the Senate maneuver was intended to press for unified rules 
regulating the establishment of blind trusts.  The Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs held hearings on blind trusts in June 1977.62  
Congress eventually enacted the Ethics in Government Act on October 
26, 1978, which included rules governing qualified blind trusts.63 
III. WHY BLIND TRUSTS FAIL TO DETER OR AVOID CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST 
A large part of why blind trusts fail to safeguard against conflicts of 
interest is because they operate contrary to traditional trust norms.  To 
understand the faults of blind trusts, then, it is first important to 
understand how a traditional trust works as a financial management 
device. 
                                                     
 61. S. Res. 110, 95th Cong. (1977) (resolving to amend Rule XLII of the Standing Rules of the 
Senate). 
 62. SENATE BLIND TRUST REPORT, supra note 56, at 8. 
 63. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978). 
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A. Traditional Private Trusts Compared with Blind Trusts 
A private trust is a legal arrangement under which a trustee manages 
property for one or more beneficiaries.64  In a traditional trust, a grantor 
establishes the trust by conveying property to a trustee to manage for a 
person who is not willing or able to do so.65  The trustee owns legal title 
to trust property and is held to a fiduciary standard of conduct.66  As a 
fiduciary, the trustee must manage the trust property according to the 
interests of the beneficiaries.  The trustees actions are judged by an 
objective standard of care.67 
Under this traditional version of a trust, a trustee must provide 
beneficiaries with enough information about the trust property and its 
management to enable beneficiaries to protect their interests.68  
Depending on the nature of the beneficiarys interest, a trustee usually 
has to provide an annual report of information related to the trust 
property, liabilities, receipts, and disbursements, including the source and 
amount of the trustees compensation, a listing of the trust assets and, if 
                                                     
 64. Trusts are now commonly used for estate planning purposes, as well as for gratuitous 
transfers and management of property.  When a grantor establishes a trust for estate planning 
purposes, state law does not require the grantor, trustee and beneficiary to be three separate parties.  
Rather, a grantor can avoid probate by conveying all of his assets into a revocable trust.  The grantor 
is also the trustee and beneficiary during his lifetime, and the trust names a beneficiary to receive the 
trusts assets when the grantor dies.  JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 485 
(7th ed. 2005).  As long as the trust names a beneficiary on the death of the grantor, courts have 
declared that the division of legal and equitable title is maintained even though the grantor retains 
the power to revoke the trust during his life.  E.g., Farkas v. Williams, 125 N.E.2d 600, 604 (Ill. 
1955).  This death-time beneficiary has an equitable interest in the trust; therefore the initial grantor 
owes the same fiduciary duty to this death-time beneficiary as would any trustee.  Id. at 60708. 
 65. Trusts were created in medieval England when grantors conveyed land to someone else to 
manage for the benefit of members of religious orders who had taken vows of poverty and were 
forbidden from owning property.  GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE 
LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 11 (1965).  Early trusts under feudalism were also used to avoid 
paying obligations owed to the lord of the manor.  Id.  Historically, trusts were useful primarily to 
convey property.  Modern trusts are employed and valued as flexible asset management devices.  
See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 629 
(1995). 
 66. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 64, at 490. 
 67. Id. at 49091. 
 68. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 813 (2000) (amended 2005).  A trustee does not need to furnish 
information to beneficiaries with remote remainder interests. Id. § 813 cmt.  The exact scope of 
fiduciary duties varies somewhat among the states.  The Uniform Trust Code, completed by the 
Uniform Law Commissioners in 2000, has been adopted by nineteen states and the District of 
Columbia.  The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, A Few Facts About 
the . . . Uniform Trust Code, http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-utc 
2000.asp (last visited Mar. 9, 2007).  See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 82 (2005) 
(describing trustees general duty to furnish information to beneficiaries). 
08 - BALLARD FINAL II.DOC 12/10/2007  1:40:20 PM 
58 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
feasible, their respective market values.69  With this information, the 
beneficiary can monitor the extent to which a trustee is complying with 
fiduciary duties.70 
The traditional trust exploits a beneficiarys self-interest while 
attempting to curb a trustees self-interest. Only the beneficiary has a 
financial motive to scrutinize the trustees performance and adherence to 
trustee standards.  A trustees erstwhile interest in usurping trust funds is 
counteracted by the liability that fiduciary law imposes on such 
wrongdoing. 
Blind trusts try to replicate the asset management function of a 
traditional sighted trust without relying on a beneficiary to watch over 
the trustee.  To the contrary, a blind trust operates against the self-interest 
of a beneficiary by forbidding the extensive reporting that the trustee of a 
traditional trust owes to beneficiaries.  The blindness involved is that 
of the beneficiary, who is kept in the dark by the trustee about the 
identity and management of the trust assets.  By definition, then, a blind 
trust alters the very element of a traditional trust that makes the 
instrument work as a means to allow one person to manage wealth for 
another.71 
As a general proposition, there are two interrelated problems with 
using a blind trust to prevent conflicts of interest.  First, because neither 
the trustee nor the beneficiary has sufficient incentive to keep the 
blindfold on, the trust may not actually prevent conflicts of interest.  In a 
traditional private trust, a beneficiarys self-interest operates to ensure 
the trustee is complying with the trustees duties.  A blind trustees duty 
to withhold information about the trusts investments, however, is not in 
the beneficiarys immediate self-interest.72  To the contrary, the blind 
                                                     
 69. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 813(c) (2000) (amended 2005); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TRUSTS § 83 (2005) (describing trustees duty to keep records and provide reports). 
 70. A beneficiary who is a minor child or incompetent adult will necessarily rely on a parent, 
guardian, or conservator to receive information from a trustee and monitor the trustees compliance 
with fiduciary duties.  See supra note 23. 
 71. A blind trust also resembles a modern revocable trust in that the grantor and the primary 
beneficiary are one and the same person.  See supra note 64.  It is, however, very different from a 
typical revocable trust.  The grantor of a blind trust must relinquish control over his assets to an 
outside trustee, unlike a typical revocable trust grantor who often maintains control as trustee.  In 
addition, the purpose of a revocable trust is probate avoidance rather than to manage assets for 
someone else, so the trustees adherence to fiduciary duties becomes less important.  See supra note 
64. 
 72. Incentives or penalties established by law to regulate a blind trust can bring the 
maintenance of blindness more within a beneficiarys self-interest.  Executive branch employees 
who knowingly participate in matters affecting their financial interests are subject to criminal 
sanctions.  18 U.S.C. § 208 (2000).  Members of Congress may incur civil penalties for seeking 
prohibited information from a trustee.  See infra notes 7879 and accompanying text (discussing 
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trusts grantor qua beneficiary is likely very interested in keeping 
updated on the status and management of his assets.  And it is this 
grantor turned beneficiary who selects and pays the trustee, and retains 
the right to revoke the trust.  This could potentially affect the trustees 
resolve to maintain the blindfold.  Furthermore, without the flow of 
information regarding the management of the trust from the trustee to the 
beneficiary, the third party trustee becomes less accountable.  The lack of 
trustee oversight may also tend to erode incentives for blindness.  A 
trustee who wants to avoid an after-the-fact claim for breach of fiduciary 
duty may be inclined to share proscribed information regarding trust 
assets.  Likewise, a grantor troubled by the lack of oversight may 
pressure a trustee for this prohibited information. 
Second, the existence of a blind trust may appear to eliminate the 
possibility that a conflict of interest will arise for a policymaker, when it 
in fact does not.  A blind trust does not automatically shield a 
policymaker from conflicts of interest, given that the policymaker knows 
the identity of the assets he initially placed in a blind trust, and may have 
restricted a trustee from transferring some of these assets.73  Where a 
blind trust masks an actual or apparent conflict of interest, members of 
the public may think that a decision is impartial when it may in fact be 
tainted by a policymakers knowledge and protection of his personal 
investments.  Blind trusts, then, impair the openness of the decision-
making process that is key to democratic governance. 
B. Mechanisms to Substitute for a Beneficiarys Self-Interest 
Qualified blind trust rules try to squelch a beneficiarys self-
interested desire to seek information from a trustee and attempt to 
replace the valuable role this self-interest plays in scrutinizing a trustees 
actions.  The rules also establish a means of monitoring the flow of 
information, or lack thereof, between an interested party and a trustee.74  
For example, the qualified blind trust statute puts a supervising ethics 
office in charge of determining whether a trust arrangement meets the 
criteria for a qualified blind trust.75  The supervising ethics office must 
also approve of a proposed trustee, presumably by ensuring that the 
                                                                                                                       
penalties). 
 73. See 5 U.S.C. app. § 102(f)(3)(B) (2000) (authorizing a supervising ethics office to approve 
a restriction on the transferability of an asset). 
 74. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (defining interested party as a reporting 
individual, his spouse, and any minor or dependent child). 
 75. 5 U.S.C. § 102(f)(7)(C).  See also supra note 47 and accompanying text (identifying three 
supervising ethics offices). 
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trustee meets the statutory criteria for being independent.76  This same 
office is designated to receive copies of authorized written 
communications between an interested party and his trustee.77  Finally, 
the Ethics in Government Act subjects a trustee and a reporting 
individual to civil penalties for attempting to take off the blindfold 
shielding the reporting individual from knowledge of his assets.78  The 
Attorney General may bring a civil action against anyone who knowingly 
and willfully, or even negligently, discloses or solicits unauthorized blind 
trust information.79  The bill initially passed by the Senate in 1977 
authorized not only civil penalties, but also imprisonment for up to one 
year for knowing and willful violations.80  The final version that 
Congress enacted in 1978, however, omitted criminal liability.81 
A public official may have additional incentive to maintain blindness 
beyond the civil penalties provided for in the Ethics in Government Act.  
A policymakers circumvention or violation of the blind trust rules could 
attract public criticism and result in the loss of a position or career.  
Moreover, separate legislation subjects executive branch employees to 
criminal liability for substantial and knowing financial conflicts of  
 
 
                                                     
 76. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing independence of trustee). 
 77. 5 U.S.C. §102 (f)(5)(E).  See supra notes 4042 and accompanying text (relating to 
authorized communication between an interested party and a trustee). 
 78. A trustee may not disclose unauthorized information to an interested party, may not 
acquire assets prohibited by the trust instrument, may not solicit advice from an interested party 
regarding the trust if the trust instrument or the statute forbids doing so, and may not fail to file any 
document required to be filed by the statute.  5 U.S.C. § 102(f)(6)(A)(i)(iv).  A reporting individual 
may not solicit or receive unauthorized information regarding a qualified blind trust, nor fail to file 
any document required by the qualified blind trust rules.  Id. § 102(f)(6)(B)(i)(ii). 
 79. In an action regarding a knowing and willful violation, a court may not assess a penalty 
exceeding $10,000.  Id. § 102(f)(6)(C)(i).  In an action regarding a negligent violation, a court may 
not assess a penalty exceeding $5000.  Id. § 102(f)(6)(C)(ii).  This author has not been able to 
identify any civil actions brought by the Attorney General under these provisions. 
 80. SENATE BLIND TRUST REPORT, supra note 56, app. A at 33 (reproducing the qualified blind 
trust provisions of S. 555, 95th Cong. (1977), which would have imposed criminal sanctions in § 
303(d)(6)(C)(i)). 
 81. Congress recently authorized imprisonment of not more than one year for any person who 
knowingly and willfully falsifies information that a person is required to report under 5 U.S.C. § 
102, the Ethics in Government Act.  Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. 
110-81 § 702, 121 Stat. 735, 77576, available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc. 
cgi?dbname=110_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ081.110.pdf.  This criminal penalty apparently 
applies not only to trust information included in a financial disclosure report, but to any document 
that must be filed with a supervising ethics office, including a trust document, a list of the assets 
initially transferred into the trust, a notice from a reporting individual that he has transferred a new 
asset into an existing blind trust, copies of written communication between a trustee and an 
interested party, and notification of the dissolution of a blind trust. 
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interest.82  For the trustee, the statutory civil penalties may pale in 
comparison to liability for breaching fiduciary duties.83 
C. Flaws with Statutory Blindfold and Ameliorative Attempts 
The safeguards discussed above do not fully replace the oversight 
traditionally performed by a self-interested beneficiary.  Consequently, 
public officials benefiting from blind trusts may have a strong impulse to 
seek prohibited trust information.  Knowing that a trustee is independent 
and is not sharing proscribed information with a beneficiary does not 
ensure the trustee is living up to the trustees fiduciary duties.  Nor do 
quarterly reports of net cash value or gains and losses of a trust suffice to 
ensure that a trustee is complying with fiduciary obligations.  This 
information does not guarantee a trustee is adhering to the duty of 
loyalty,84 the prudent investor rule,85 the duty to diversify trust assets,86  
 
                                                     
 82. 18 U.S.C. §208(a) (2000).  See supra note 49 (discussing the Bribery, Graft and Conflicts 
of Interest statute). 
 83. Under the Uniform Trust Code, a trustee is liable to the beneficiaries for violating trustee 
duties and may be compelled to redress a breach by paying money, restoring property, or other 
means.  UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1001(b)(3) (2000) (amended 2005). 
 84. The trustees duty of loyalty is to administer the trust solely in the interest of the 
beneficiaries.  UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(a) (2000) (amended 2005).  The duty of loyalty precludes a 
trustee from, among other things, engaging personally in transactions involving trust property.  UNIF. 
TRUST CODE § 802(a) (2000) (amended 2005); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(b) (2005). 
See also UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 5 (1994) ([T]rustee shall invest and manage the trust 
assets solely in the interest of the beneficiaries.).  Forty-five states, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the 
District of Columbia have adopted the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, which was approved by the 
Uniform Law Commissioners in 1994.  The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws, A Few Facts about the . . . Uniform Prudent Investors Act, http://www.nccusl. 
org/nccusl/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-upria.asp, (last visited Aug. 23, 2007).  See also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(a) (2005) (discussing duty of loyalty in the trustee and trust 
relationship). 
 85. The prudent investor rule requires the trustee to invest and manage trust assets as a prudent 
investor would, by considering the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other 
circumstances of the trust.  UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(a) (1994).  While the rule has 
common law roots, it has been codified in the Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Uniform 
Probate Code: the trustee has a duty to observe the standards in dealing with the trust assets that 
would be observed by a prudent man dealing with the property of another . . . .  UNIF. PROBATE 
CODE § 7-302 (2005).  The Restatement (Third) of Trusts also includes a prudent investor rule.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 (1990) (renumbered & amended 2005).  Most states have 
enacted legislation governing a trustees investment-related duties.  Prefatory Note, UNIF. PRUDENT 
INVESTOR ACT, at 34 (1994). 
 86. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 3.  The duty to diversify requires a trustee to see that 
assets comprise a broad, diversified portfolio, rather than allow investments to be concentrated in 
only a few industries or sectors of the economy.  Id.  § 3 cmt. at 29 (1994).  The purpose of 
diversification is to reduce the risk of investing.  Id. 
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rules governing proper delegation of trustee powers,87 or the duty to keep 
trust property separate from the trustees own property.88 
The qualified blind trust disclosure and communication restrictions 
would not necessarily shed light on a trustee in violation of one or more 
of these duties.  For example, a trustee might improperly delegate to a 
family member the authority to invest sixty percent of the trust funds into 
fine art (violating the duty to diversify) that is hanging in the trustees 
home (violating the duty of loyalty and the duty to keep trust property 
separate).  Since the quarterly statements might not raise suspicion, the 
trustees violation of these duties could remain unnoticed until the fine 
art market takes a turn for the worse, the trustees home burns to the 
ground and the trust property is destroyed, or the trustee absconds with 
the art and is never heard from again.  The purpose of a trustees 
accounting obligation to a beneficiary is to enable a beneficiary to 
discover a breach of fiduciary duty before disaster strikes and the trust 
assets are lost. 89 
The model blind trusts disseminated by the Senate and executive 
branch try to plug this gap in trustee accountability by including a 
provision that requires the trustee to submit a full and complete financial 
accounting to the policymaker when a blind trust terminates.90  This 
after-the-fact oversight may help ease the mind of a beneficiary.  It may, 
however, present problems for a trustee, because it might encourage an 
                                                     
 87. A trustee may delegate investment and management decisions as long as the trustee 
reasonably selects an agent, defines the scope and terms of delegation, and reviews the agents 
decisions.  Id. § 9(a)(1)(3). 
 88. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 810(b) (2000) (amended 2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS 
§ 179 (1959) (describing a trustees duty to keep trust property separate from the trustees own 
property). 
 89. Some trust law scholars maintain that fiduciary duties simply are default rules and that the 
grantor and trustee can agree by contract to waive them.  See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 65, at 629 
(arguing that trustees fiduciary duties find their origin in contract law); see also Melanie B. Leslie, 
Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default Rules, 94 GEO. L.J. 67, 69 (2005) 
(pointing out that [t]he default rule paradigm has increasingly influenced doctrine and permeates 
the recently promulgated Uniform Trust Code . . . .) (footnote omitted).  Under a contractarian view 
of trusts, a grantor and trustee could privately agree to modify or waive application of some 
fiduciary rules.  Others, however, argue against the ability to waive or significantly modify essential 
trustee duties.  Id. at 6970.  Even if a policymaker could legally waive application of fiduciary 
duties, it seems highly unlikely that he would be willing to do so with no ability to monitor the 
trustees performance. 
 90. Senate Select Comm. on Ethics, Sample Trust Agreement art. 15 (Oct. 7, 1994), http:// 
ethics.senate.gov/downloads/pdffiles/trust.pdf [hereinafter Senate Sample Trust Agreement] (last 
visited Sept. 16, 2007); Office of Govt Ethics, Model Qualified Blind Trust Provisions art. 17 (Mar. 
2002 draft), http://www.usoge.gov/pages/forms_pubs_otherdocs/fpo_files/forms/frmodel_f38.pdf 
[hereinafter OGE Model Blind Trust] (last visited Sept. 16, 2007).  This requirement is not part of 
the Ethics in Government Act, nor does it appear in the regulations governing executive branch blind 
trusts. 
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assessment of the trustees performance from a superior position of 
hindsight.  Whether a trustee has complied with fiduciary duties, 
particularly investment-related duties, is supposed to be determined in 
light of the facts and circumstances existing at the time of a trustees 
decision or action and not by hindsight.91 
Blindness may be easier for trustees who have no proclivity to 
discuss investment decisions with a beneficiary.  Nonetheless, the 
reporting individual has power over the trustee that may be sufficient to 
persuade a trustee to divulge information proscribed by the Ethics in 
Government Act.  The reporting individual is the person who selects the 
trustee and the person who pays the trustees fees.  In addition, the 
reporting individual can seek to remove the trustee or can simply revoke 
the trust. 
The threshold for trustee removal is not specified in the statute, but is 
set forth in vague terms in the regulations that govern executive branch 
blind trusts.92  The Ethics in Government Act requires supervising ethics 
offices to approve only trustee selection, not trustee removal.93  
Executive branch regulations and the model blind trust instruments from 
supervising ethics offices permit a trustee to be substituted upon a 
showing of necessity and appropriateness.94  A trustees interest in 
retaining the policymakers business may erode resolve to keep 
investment data undisclosed if a beneficiary is pressuring for 
information. 
                                                     
 91. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 8 (1994). 
 92. Executive branch qualified blind trusts operate under a set of administrative regulations that 
do not govern legislative qualified blind trusts.  5 C.F.R. §§ 2634.401409 (2007). 
 93. 5 U.S.C. app. § 102(f)(3)(D) (2000). 
 94. 5 C.F.R. § 2634.405(e) (2007) (The terms of a qualified trust may not be revoked or 
amended, except with the prior written approval of the Director, and upon a showing of necessity 
and appropriateness.).  The Senate Sample Trust Agreement states that [a]ny amendment of the 
terms of this Trust Agreement, including the appointment of a substitute or successor Trustee, shall 
require the prior written approval [o]f the Committee, upon a showing of necessity and 
appropriateness unless it relates to the testamentary provisions of this trust.  Senate Sample Trust 
Agreement, supra note 90, art. 18.  The executive branch Model Qualified Blind Trust Provisions 
includes nearly identical language.  OGE Model Blind Trust, supra note 90, art. 20.  There 
apparently is no established standard by which to measure necessity and appropriateness.  
Telephone conversation with Katja Eichinger, counsel, Senate Select Comm. on Ethics (Feb. 23, 
2007).  Interestingly, this express authorization to replace a trustee appears to be relatively new.  The 
Office of Government Ethics Model Qualified Blind Trust Provisions, dated November 1, 1980, 
does not include such a provision.  Instead, this earlier version allows revocation or amendment to 
the terms of the trust agreement with prior written approval, upon a showing of necessity and 
appropriatenessomitting the clause specifically relating to the appointment of a substitute or 
successor Trustee.  Office of Govt Ethics, Model Qualified Blind Trust Provisions art. 1(B) (Nov. 
1, 1980 draft), reprinted in FEDERAL ETHICS HANDBOOK E-83 (1981). 
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Because blind trust rules do not sufficiently compensate for the lack 
of oversight by the beneficiary over his trustee found in a traditional 
sighted trust, blind trusts may not actually avoid conflicts of interest, 
given the powerful incentive for a beneficiary to seek information on his 
assets.  Moreover, the rules do not address the fact that the existence of a 
blind trust may lead public observers to believe that policymakers are 
indeed avoiding conflicts, when this might not be the case.  The rules 
leave a significant gap inasmuch as misleading public comments can 
suggest a blind trust is truly blind when it might not be.  Senator Frist 
took advantage of this gap by stating publicly that he did not know 
whether his blind trusts held HCA stock, when he had good reason to 
know that they did.95 
The statutory efforts to maintain blindness, to provide oversight and 
to impose penalties for violations are not sufficient to overcome the 
problems inherent in blind trusts.  Blindness runs contrary to the way 
most owners treat their property.  An owner of property has a natural 
tendency to seek information on the health and management of an 
investment, particularly when the welfare of the owner or someone close 
to the owner depends on the investment.  This natural tendency might be 
particularly strong for a newly-elected member of the House, who would 
be relinquishing power over his assets for what might only be a two-year 
term. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Full Disclosure Coupled with Recusal or Divestiture 
The best solution to the inadequacies of blind trusts is to eliminate 
their use as an exception to financial disclosure.  Complete disclosure 
should be the rule.  As Justice Louis Brandeis remarked, sunlight . . . is 
the best of disinfectants.96  The idea that openness of the democratic 
process leads to accountability is the entire premise behind requiring 
financial disclosure.97  It also comports with the recent trend to enhance  
 
                                                     
 95. See supra notes 910 and accompanying text. 
 96. Publicity is justly commended as a remedy of social and industrial diseases.  Sunlight is 
said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.  LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, 
OTHER PEOPLES MONEY 92 (1932). 
 97. The Senate Report on the Ethics in Government Act lists five rationales supporting public 
financial disclosure.  Among them are that disclosure will increase public confidence in government 
and will enable the public to judge the performance of public officials.  S. REP. NO. 95-170, at 2122 
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 423738. 
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and enforce disclosure in campaign finance law and with regard to 
policymakers interaction with lobbyists.98 
Requiring officials to disclose the identity of their financial interests 
on public financial disclosure forms puts the burden on the public to 
discover a potential conflict of interest.  Once financial interests are 
disclosed and a potential conflict brought to light, a policymaker could 
present evidence that no conflict is posed, seek a waiver from conflict of 
interest rules, divest himself of the interest, or recuse himself from 
official decision-making related to the private interest. 99 
The policymakers who initially formulated the qualified blind trust 
favored disclosure and considered blind trusts extraordinary.  The Senate 
Committee on Governmental Affairs, charged with drafting blind trust 
standards, recommended that [f]or most government officials, conflicts 
of interest were best avoided by financial disclosure, together with the 
divestiture or liquidation of those holdings . . . [creating] potential 
conflicts . . . or recusal from decisionmaking in matters where the 
outcome may materially affect the financial interests of the individual or 
his family . . . .100  The Committee expressly stated that it did not 
recommend blind trusts for all government officials.101 
                                                     
 98. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).  The 
act furthered the interests of disclosure by banning national parties and federal candidates from 
raising soft money ([previously] unregulated contributions to political parties or committees).  
Audra L. Wassom, Campaign Finance Legislation: McCain-Feingold/Shays-MeehanThe Political 
Equality Rationale and Beyond, 55 SMU L. REV. 1781, 1790 (2002).  See also Honest Leadership 
and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-81, 121 Stat. 735, available at http://frwebgate. 
access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ081.110.pdf 
(strengthening the Lobbying Disclosure Act). 
 99. Charles D. Fox & David A. Herpe, Blind Trusts: Easing the Burdens of Government 
Service, TR. & EST., Mar. 1993, at 28, 2830. 
 100. SENATE BLIND TRUST REPORT, supra note 56, at 12. 
 101. Id.  Blind trusts may not be as extraordinary as initially anticipated.  According to the 
Senate Office of Public Records, the number of senators who maintain blind trusts tends to fluctuate 
between fifteen and twenty.  Telephone Conversation with Pamela Gavin, Pub. Records 
Superintendent, Senate Office of Pub. Records (Feb. 23, 2007).  As of February 2006, in addition to 
Frist, 17 senators and several members of the House used blind trusts.  Costa, supra note 1, at 19.  
The same number applied as of February 2007.  Telephone conversation with Pamela Gavin, Pub. 
Records Superintendent, Senate Office of Pub. Records (Feb. 23, 2007).  The exact number of blind 
trusts in use in the House of Representatives and the executive branch is unknown.  The House of 
Representatives Clerks Office, which houses public documents, would not count the number of 
blind trusts in use within the House and suggested the author could visit the Legislative Resource 
Center to perform her own count.  Telephone conversation with Janice Glosson, Registration and 
Compliance Clerk, Legislative Res. Ctr., Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 6, 
2007).  When the author attempted to perform a count of House blind trusts in person, the 
Legislative Resource Center (Center) provided a list of names under the heading Blind Trust 
Agreements.  Center staff said the list, a 2005 tally of blind trusts among members of the House, 
was the most recent one available.  The list showed that only nine blind trust agreements still 
remain active.  Incredibly, however, six of the nine members had retired before 2005, the 
Honorable Peter Hoagland having retired a full decade earlier.  Interview with Janice Glosson, 
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Disclosure, coupled with alternative actions once a potential conflict 
arises, is not a trouble-free solution for a variety of reasons.  Disclosure 
itself can be problematic.  It may deter qualified individuals from seeking 
public office or contributing to government service.  Disclosure may 
invite frivolous claims of conflicts that impair governance.  A more 
extreme possibility is that an opponent or opportunist could use financial 
information to sabotage an officials financial welfare or even threaten 
family members.  The Ethics in Government Act implicitly recognizes 
these possibilities and declares it unlawful for any person to obtain or use 
a financial disclosure report for any unlawful or commercial purpose, 
other than commercial use by media for dissemination to the general 
public.102 
Further, even if the disclosure hurdle is cleared, the options for 
dealing with a potential or actual conflict will not always be easy to 
apply.  In some instances, it may not be feasible for an official to recuse 
himself as often as the circumstances might require to avoid conflicts of 
interest.  For example, high-level White House employees with 
diversified investment portfolios who participate in decisions affecting 
an array of industries could be asked to recuse so frequently that their 
ability to govern would be impaired.  Furthermore, U.S. Senators and 
Representatives cannot be compelled to disqualify themselves from 
voting on matters related to their outside financial holdings.103  The 
House of Representatives Ethics Manual explains that recusal is 
disfavored because it results in the disenfranchisement of a Members 
entire constituency on particular issues.104  Presumably, financial 
disclosure operates to deter official decision-making on matters in which 
a member of Congress has a private financial interest because of the 
specter of being voted out of office.  Despite a Congressional policy 
against abstention, recusal was presented as a viable alternative to blind 
trusts in debates before the enactment of current qualified blind trust 
rules.105 
                                                                                                                       
Registration and Compliance Clerk, Legislative Res. Ctr., Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of 
Representatives, in Wash., D.C. (Apr. 26, 2007).  The list is on file with the author. 
 102. 5 U.S.C. app. § 105(c)(1) (2000).  The Act further authorizes the Attorney General to 
bring a civil action against [anyone] who obtains or uses a report for a prohibited purpose.  Id. § 
105(c)(2). 
 103. SELECT COMMITTEE ON ETHICS, UNITED STATES SENATE, SENATE ETHICS MANUAL 124 
(2003); HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 3, at 153. 
 104. See HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 3, at 157.  Senator Frist is reported to have 
rejected suggestions that he recuse himself from consideration of health-care legislation because of 
his HCA investments.  Jube Shiver, Jr., Frists Possible Conflicts Seen As No Problem Under Senate 
Rules, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2002, at A27. 
 105. SENATE BLIND TRUST REPORT, supra note 56, at 8, 11 (summarizing testimony from the 
June 7 and 9, 1977 hearings of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs).  Senator John 
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Divestiture also is not a certain cure.  Its efficacy as a solution to 
financial conflicts of interest is limited, depending on the employees 
duties.  An employee cannot be expected to divest himself of all assets to 
avoid all financial conflicts.  Doing so may present a hardship, 
particularly if the sale results in significant capital gains tax liability or 
the interest is a partnership or family corporation.106  Tax laws can be 
amended to minimize capital gains tax liability, but there is no remedy to 
a forced divestiture of family-held financial interests.107  Under a 
complete disclosure regime, a person holding financial interests that pose 
a conflict with official duties, for which both recusal and divestiture is 
impracticable, may be forced to forgo government service. 
Executive branch employees have an additional, albeit limited, 
option if full disclosure reveals the existence of a conflict of interest.  
Under the Bribery, Graft, and Conflicts of Interest statute, an executive 
branch employee may seek a waiver of conflict of interest rules and be 
exempt from liability for acting in an official capacity while affected by a 
personal financial interest.108  A conflict of interest may be waived only 
for very narrow reasons, one being the employees financial interest is 
not substantial enough to affect the integrity of that employees official 
duties.109  Waivers, however, can be time consuming for the official who 
must explain the financial interest implicated and the conflict that it 
poses with his duties. 
B. Alternative: Reform Blind Trust Legislation 
Many policymakers and observers may consider complete financial 
disclosure an extreme solution to guarantee that a policymakers 
financial interests do not affect governmental decisions.  Because of the 
difficulties and risks associated with financial disclosure, it is likely that 
the blind trust will continue to operate as an exception to disclosure. 
If blind trusts remain an alternative to complete disclosure, the 
qualified blind trust rules must be amended to strengthen their ability to 
                                                                                                                       
Durkin advocated that senators be required to disqualify themselves from participating in any vote 
on any issue in which the senator or a family member had a direct financial interest.  Id. at 11.  
Currently, recusal from participation in a matter is the most common form of Ethics Agreement seen 
in the executive branch.  REVIEWERS REFERENCE, supra note 31, at 5-4. 
 106. Fox & Herpe, supra note 99, at 30. 
 107. A witness at the Senate hearings on blind trusts, Alan Morrison, Director of Litigation, 
Public Citizen, suggested postponing capital gains tax liability incurred as a result of divestiture.  
SENATE BLIND TRUST REPORT, supra note 56, at 11. 
 108. 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(1) (2000). 
 109. Id. The legislative history reflects an intent to allow waivers for interests of insignificant 
proportions.  S. REP. NO. 87-2213, reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3852, 3863. 
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deter conflicts of interest.  The remainder of this section proposes 
fortification of four different areas of blind trust operation and 
enforcement: 1) the rules regarding initial assets must be modified to 
ensure that these assets are converted to a form of investment not 
disclosed to beneficiaries; 2) the system of selecting and monitoring 
trustees must be changed to minimize a beneficiarys incentive to remove 
the blindfold and monitor a trustees performance; 3) a trust beneficiarys 
financial disclosure requirements must be broadened to facilitate public 
oversight of potential conflicts of interest; and 4) additional penalties 
must be imposed for rule violations to further solidify blindness and 
boost public confidence in blind trusts.  These ideas are intended to be a 
starting place for a larger debate on the appropriate scope and operation 
of blind trusts. 
Taken together, these proposals will help address the two significant 
flaws of blind trusts.  First, reforming qualified blind trusts will better 
allow the device to actually prevent conflicts because the blindfold will 
be in place more securely.  Second, public watchdogs will have sufficient 
information about a policymakers blind trust to know when it is truly 
blind.  In other words, a policymaker will not be able to hide behind the 
shield of a blind trust when he knows the identity of the assets held in his 
trust. 
Critics might argue that the proposed modifications will do little to 
actually prevent conflicts of interest in Congress because legislators need 
not abstain from decision-making when a conflict arises.  Even if it 
becomes public knowledge, for example, that a lawmaker knows the 
identity of an asset in his qualified blind trust, the legislator cannot be 
compelled to abstain from decision-making, nor can he be required to 
request that a trustee dispose of the asset.110  Nonetheless, these 
modifications will facilitate public oversight of potential conflicts.  
Legislators can forecast closer scrutiny and more public pressure should 
they continue to hold assets that pose frequent conflicts with official 
duties.  Accordingly, these modifications may, in fact, prevent conflicts 
from occurring, at least when a legislator plans to seek reelection. 
Furthermore, the only other option to actually prevent conflicts in 
Congress would be to require blind trusts for legislators who cannot 
recuse themselves when faced with a conflict of interest.  Compulsory 
blind trusts for legislators, under the following proposed amended rules, 
would indeed be more effective as a means of avoiding conflicts.  
                                                     
 110. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.  Instructing a trustee to sell an asset that creates 
a conflict of interest is one of the statutorily authorized subjects of communication. 5 U.S.C. app.  § 
102(f)(3)(C)(vi) (2000). 
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However, requiring lawmakers to transfer their assets into blind trusts, 
along with those of spouses and dependent children, would likely 
discourage too many qualified candidates from considering public office. 
1. Modify Rules Related to Initial Assets 
A blind trust is only truly blind once the trustee transfers the initial 
assets out of the trust and replaces them with investments that the trustee 
is forbidden from disclosing to the reporting individual.  Congress should 
consider four changes to current qualified blind trust rules to ensure that 
a reporting individual will, indeed, become blind to the initial assets and 
that this blindness will occur within a reasonable time after the trusts 
creation. 
First, the rules should limit the type of financial interests that a 
grantor can place in a blind trust, so that holdings initially deposited are 
cash or easily transferable assets.111  Requiring that a trust be funded 
solely with these types of readily marketable interests will allow a trustee 
to convey them out of a trust and reinvest the proceeds into new assets 
unknown to the reporting individual.  Partnership interests, closely held 
family corporations, certain real estate holdingsassets that the 
reporting individual truly does not want to or is unable to transfer
should not be allowed to be held in a blind trust.112  This limitation 
should also apply to any assets that a reporting individual transfers into a 
qualified blind trust after it is established.  Assets that are not readily 
marketable are not appropriate for blind trusts and should be subject to 
financial disclosure obligations.113 
Current blind trust rules already recognize the value of transferring 
only diversified assets to a blind trust.  If a policymaker establishes a 
blind trust with a well-diversified portfolio of readily marketable 
                                                     
 111. This was one of President Carters initial criteria for blind trusts, set forth in his January 
1977 ethics guidelines.  Texts of Carter Statement on Conflicts of Interest and Ethics; Appointees 
Guidelines, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1977, at A17.  Alaska statutes authorize blind trusts for some public 
officials to limit their financial disclosure obligations.  Alaskas rules do, however, limit the type of 
assets that may be transferred into the trust.  Before 2007, the requirement was only that the assets 
shall be marketable.  ALASKA STAT. § 39.50.040(b)(1) (2004).  Recent legislation expands this 
rule to prohibit, among other assets, assets with permanency that makes transfer by the trustee 
improbable or impractical.  Act of July 9, 2007, ch. 47, sec. 57, § 39.50.040(b)(1), 2007 Alaska 
Adv. Legis. Serv. 47 (LexisNexis). 
 112. Alaskas current statute gives a similar list: real estate, security interests in personal 
property, mortgages, and interests in closely held businesses.  Id. 
 113. See SENATE BLIND TRUST REPORT, supra note 56, at 5 (suggesting that a blind trust with 
holdings [which] are likely to remain unchanged . . . is hardly a blind trust.  It is nothing more than 
a management device.). 
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securities, then the reporting individual does not need to treat the initial 
trust assets as a financial interest for purposes of conflict of interest 
rules.114  Furthermore, the trustee does not need to notify the reporting 
individual when any of these initial assets are transferred out of the 
trust.115  Nonetheless, a reporting individual currently is not required to 
restrict blind trust interests to such diversified holdings. 
Second, Congress should require a trustee to sell initial assets that 
may pose a conflict of interest as soon as is practicable after a reporting 
individual identifies the potential conflict.116  Assuming that the first 
suggestion to limit initial blind trust holdings to easily transferable assets 
or cash is followed, a speedy sale of some initial trust property should 
pose no problem. 
Third, blind trust rules should require trustees to turn over a certain 
percentage of the initial assets within a particular time frame to create 
more immediate blindness.117  For example, within the first year of the 
trusts existence, a trustee could be required to transfer and reinvest at 
least sixty percent of the initial assets.  A turn-over requirement is 
particularly feasible if the initial assets are limited to readily transferable 
investments, as suggested above.  Trustees may be more comfortable 
operating under a mandatory sale rule if they are given safe harbor from 
the application of prudent investor rules.118  While it might not be 
prudent for a trustee of a traditional private trust to turn over such a large 
percentage of initial assets, trustees compelled to do so under revised 
qualified blind trust rules should be shielded from liability. 
Finally, a reporting individual should never be allowed to restrict a 
trustees power to transfer a particular asset.  Qualified blind trust rules 
currently allow an official to instruct a trustee not to sell an inception 
asset, as long as the supervising ethics office approves of the 
restriction.119  Accordingly, a new qualified blind trust can include assets 
that the trustee cannot transfer, so the reporting individual will continue 
to know the identity of these holdings.  Assets over which a policymaker 
                                                     
 114. 5 U.S.C. app. § 102(f)(4)(B)(i)(I) (2000). 
 115. Id. § 102(f)(4)(B)(i). 
 116. This was part of the Department of the Interiors regulations regarding blind trusts for its 
employees, effective July 1975.  SENATE BLIND TRUST REPORT, supra note 56, at 3 (citing 43 
C.F.R. § 20.735.24(a)(3)). 
 117. Witnesses suggested this idea during the Senate Committee hearings in 1977, but Congress 
apparently rejected it as an arbitrary way of monitoring blind trusts.  Id. at 10 (summarizing 
testimony from the June 7 and 9, 1977, hearings of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs). 
 118. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing the trustees duty to manage trust 
assets as a prudent investor). 
 119. 5 U.S.C. app. § 102(f)(3)(B) (2000). 
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wishes to maintain ownership should be disclosed rather than protected 
by the appearance of blindness.  A trustee of a blind trust must have 
complete discretion to dispose of any trust asset. 
These proposals may give rise to the same capital gains tax liability 
problems identified in the earlier discussion on divestiture.  Again, if a 
reporting individual must divest low tax basis assets so that only 
diversified assets remain in a blind trust, or a trustee must sell low tax 
basis property to adhere to these new rules, capital gains tax rules may 
need to be amended.120 
2. Strengthen Trustee and Blind Trust Monitoring 
A number of modifications can be made to qualified blind trust rules 
to strengthen compliance, improve the way a trustees performance is 
monitored, and enhance the independence of a trustee.  These include 
establishing an independent government body to supervise blind trust 
creation and administration or delegating such supervisory responsibility 
to a private entity; authorizing only trustees selected from a slate of 
preapproved institutional trustees; disclosing the name of blind trustees 
on financial disclosure reports; assigning trustee monitoring 
responsibility to an independent entity or to the Attorney General; and 
clarifying the standards for trustee removal. 
To ensure compliance with limits on communication and proper 
disclosure, the statute should be amended to change the way blind trust 
rules are supervised.  The current supervisory system raises concern for 
at least two reasons.  First, low staff levels cause worry about the 
viability of managing current oversight duties.  Three separate offices 
now oversee federal qualified blind trusts.121  These minimally-staffed 
offices122 also manage other types of ethics issues for their institutions, 
such as oversight of lobbying disclosure rules.123  Among the staffs 
                                                     
 120. SENATE BLIND TRUST REPORT, supra note 56, at 11. 
 121. See supra note 47 (identifying supervising ethics offices). 
 122. The House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct employs eight staff attorneys.  
Committee Staff, http://www.house.gov/ethics/CommitteeStaff.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2007).  
The Senate Select Committee on Ethics staff includes four attorneys.  JOINT COMM. ON PRINTING, 
U.S. CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY 375 (Sept. 2006 online rev.), available at http:// 
frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_congressional_directory_interim_sep06 
&docid=109thin_txt-63.pdf.  The executive branch Office of Government Ethics, Office of General 
Counsel and Legal Policy employs sixteen staff attorneys, program analysts, and others.  U.S. Office 
of Government Ethics, http://www.usoge.gov/pages/about_oge/staff_directory.pdf (last visited Aug. 
16, 2007). 
 123. The jurisdiction of the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct is described  at 
http://www.house.gov/ethics/CommitteeJurisdiction.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2007); the scope of the 
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other duties, these offices are responsible for reviewing and approving all 
qualified blind trust instruments, initial trustee appointments, and 
amendments to trusts, and for reviewing all written communications 
between policymakers and the trustees of their blind trusts.124 
The practicality of small staffs, particularly in Congress, to manage 
significant oversight duties has troubled even some legislators.  
Legislators recently have introduced bills to create an independent Office 
of Public Integrity to supervise Congresss compliance with ethics rules, 
after a number of lobbying scandals indicated lax oversight on the part of 
the House and Senate ethics committee staffs.125  The initial 2006 
proposal ultimately failed,126 but lawmakers have since introduced new 
bills to establish an independent monitoring body, showing that questions 
about committee oversight capacities remain.127 
The second concern with current blind trust oversight relates to 
whether ethics staffs can watch over the institutions that support them.  
Skeptics might challenge the efficacy of charging staff with overseeing 
ethics rules within their own institutions.  Staff members are employed at 
the will of each of the three institutions, yet they are responsible for 
monitoring compliance with ethics rules and investigating alleged 
                                                                                                                       
Senate Select Committee on Ethics is illustrated at http://ethics.senate.gov/ (last visited Oct. 21, 
2007); the functions of the various subdivisions within the executive branch Office of Government 
ethics are explained at http://www.usoge.gov/pages/about_oge/organ_functions.html (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2007) 
 124. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 102(f)(3)(D), (f)(5)(E) (2000).  Blind trust instruments can be lengthy.  
The executive branchs Office of Government Ethics issued Model Qualified Blind Trust Provisions 
that totaled seventeen pages, excluding an appendix that lists initial assets.  OGE MODEL BLIND 
TRUST, supra note 90. 
 125. See, e.g., H.R. 4799, 109th Cong. §§ 1, 3 (2006), available at http://frwebgate.access. 
gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_bills&docid=f:h4799ih.txt.pdf (proposing an in-
dependent Office of Public Integrity that would have oversight of, among other things, financial 
disclosure and other reports filed by all members of Congress pursuant to the Ethics in Government 
Act of 1978); S. 2259, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/ 
cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_bills&docid=f:s2259is.txt.pdf (proposing an Office of Public 
Integrity only for oversight of Senate ethics matters).  The Center for Public Integrity charged that in 
the Senate alone, nearly 14,000 lobbying documents that should have been filed were missing and 
that nearly 300 individuals and entities lobbied without registering.  Alex Knott & Sam Stein, Senate 
Rejects Office of Public Integrity, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, Mar. 28, 2006, http:// 
www.publicintegrity.org/report.aspx?aid=791. 
 126. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Approves Lobbying Limits by Wide Margin, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 30, 2006, at A1 (reporting on Senate approval of a lobbying reform bill, but rejection of a 
proposed Office of Public Integrity). 
 127. See, e.g., H.R. 422, 110th Cong. (2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:h422ih.txt.pdf (proposing to establish an Office of 
Public Integrity as an independent office within the legislative branch of the Government, to reduce 
the duties of the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct of the House of Representatives and 
the Select Committee on Ethics of the Senate, and for other purposes).  Similar to its predecessor 
bill, this proposal would delegate to an independent office oversight of financial disclosure and other 
reports filed pursuant to the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.  Id. § 3(a)(1). 
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violations.  In some cases, the supervising ethics staff themselves might 
be required to submit financial disclosure statements and opt to establish 
blind trusts to limit their required disclosures.128 
These concerns can be addressed by amending the statute to create 
one independent body whose sole task is to oversee all qualified blind 
trusts.  Such an entity might be structured as an independent agency 
similar to the Federal Election Commission, which is charged with 
administering federal campaign finance law.129  Alternatively, oversight 
of blind trust rules could be delegated to a private entity.  Privatizing this 
function poses a hurdle no more significant than has privatization of 
other government jobs.130  Any number of trust companies or accounting 
firms would likely be qualified and willing to contract to monitor blind 
trusts.131 
In addition to assigning blind trust supervision to an independent 
body, the rules imposing blindness might be enhanced by exerting more 
control over trustee selection and making the identity of a trustee public.  
The rules could require that policymakers select trustees from a slate of 
institutional trustees qualified and pre-approved to serve as blind trust 
fiduciaries.  The executive branch qualified blind trust regulations 
already take a step towards this end by requiring that trustees be 
                                                     
 128. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (referring to congressional employees required to 
report financial interests). In Senate debates over a proposed Official Code of Conduct, Senator 
Goldwater proclaimed that the American people will not be fooled by an in-house procedure which 
leaves it up to the Members of Congress to police themselves.  123 CONG. REC. 10,044, 10,054 
(1977) (statement of Senator Barry Goldwater on proposed Senate Resolution 110, Official Code of 
Conduct).  While the 1978 Ethics in Government Act codified some of the rules the Senate 
voluntarily imposed on itself, the Act leaves monitoring of blind trusts in the hands of each 
institution. 
 129. Congress created the Federal Election Commission (FEC) in 1974 in an amendment to 
the Federal Elections Campaign Act.  Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 208(a), 88 Stat. 127986 (1977) 
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 437c (2000)). The Commission is composed of six members who 
are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.  2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1) (2000).  Former 
outside counsel to two prior Speakers of the U.S. House of Representatives recently suggested an 
independent monitoring body similar to the FEC as a means of regulating the conduct of lobbyists.  
Randy Evans, Follow That Lobbyist, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2007, at A15. 
 130. That is not to say that privatization of public education, prisons, subsidized housing, health 
care, welfare, and other government services has been without censure.  See, e.g., Gillian E. 
Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003) (discussing constitutional 
problems with government use of private entities to implement government programs); Mark 
Calaguas, Military Privatization: Efficiency or Anarchy?, 6 CHI.-KENT J. INTL & COMP. L. 58 
(2006), http://www.kentlaw.edu/jicl/articles/spring2006/s2006_Mark_Calaguas.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 13, 2007) (addressing concerns with the use of private military contractors). 
 131. The House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct has made a practice of recruiting 
accounting professionals from the General Accounting Office to assist in reviewing financial 
disclosure reports.  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-89-103, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE: 
LEGSLATIVE [sic] BRANCH SYSTEMS IMPROVED BUT CAN BE FURTHER STRENGTHENED 31 (1989). 
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institutions rather than individuals.132  Limiting potential trustees to 
carefully selected institutional entities could help to ensure that 
policymakers select trustees with resolve to maintain the blindness. 
The reporting individual should also be required to disclose the name 
of the trustee on each years public financial disclosure report.  
Currently, a reporting individual need not do so.  In theory, the 
overseeing ethics office maintains a copy of the trust document naming 
the trustee.  However, that information currently is available to the public 
only upon specific request and payment of a processing fee.133  While 
identifying a trustee on each years financial disclosure report would not 
directly enhance the monitoring of a trustee, doing so could bring more 
public or peer pressure on trustees to adhere to blind trust rules and 
fiduciary duties.  For example, watchdogs concerned about the 
independence of a trustee could determine whether the trustee appears on 
an elected reporting individuals list of campaign contributors. 
Additional modifications should be made to monitor trustee 
performance in managing trust property.  No individual or institution 
systematically examines whether a trustee is complying with fiduciary 
duties.134  The lack of such oversight creates incentive for a reporting 
individual to carry out his own oversight and seek more information 
from a trustee than is authorized by the Ethics in Government Act. 
An independent oversight body like the two alternatives proposed 
above could also be made responsible for overseeing trustee compliance 
with fiduciary duties.  Alternatively, trustees could be required to provide 
complete accountings to the Attorney Generals office.  This approach is 
similar to the way trustees of tax-exempt charitable trusts are 
                                                     
 132. 5 C.F.R. § 2634.406(a)(2) (2007).  Alaska also requires that the trustee of a blind trust be a 
bank, trust company, or other institutional fiduciary.  Act of July 9, 2007, ch. 47, sec. 57, § 
39.50.040(b)(2), 2007 Alaska Adv. Legis. Serv. 47 (LexisNexis). 
 133. Document retention and purging policies make some original trust documents unavailable 
to the public.  See supra note 101 and accompanying text.  The Honest Leadership and Open 
Government Act of 2007 requires the Clerk of the House of Representatives to post on its Internet 
site reports that members of the House are required to file under section 103(h)(1) of the Ethics in 
Government Act of 1978.  Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-81 § 
304, 121 Stat. 735, 75253, available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi? 
dbname=110_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ081.110.pdf.  Section 103(h)(1) refers to reports 
required under this title [Financial Disclosure Requirements of Federal Personnel].  5 U.S.C. app. § 
103(h)(1) (2006).  Because a trust instrument likely is not a report, a trust will probably not be 
included in the documents that the Clerk must post. 
 134. Trustees managing qualified blind trusts for executive branch officials, however, must 
maintain and make available for inspection by the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) the trusts 
books of account and other records. 5 C.F.R. § 2634.403(b)(11) (2007).  There is no requirement that 
OGE staff actually inspect such records. 
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monitored.135  Members of Congress, however, would likely balk at 
granting trustee monitoring authority to the Department of Justice.136 
Finally, blind trust rules should be amended to bolster the long-term 
independence of trustees.  For example, regardless of whether qualified 
blind trusts continue to be supervised by current ethics offices or by a 
new independent body, the oversight entity should have the authority to 
investigate possible violations of trust restrictions and determine that a 
trust no longer meets the requirements of a qualified blind trust based on 
violations.137  Moreover, qualified blind trust rules should be clear on the 
standard of proof necessary for trustee removal.  Mechanisms need to be 
in place to ensure that a reporting individual does not remove a trustee 
simply because the trustee refused to disclose unauthorized information 
related to the trust assets.  Specifically, the standard should be tied to the 
performance of the investments and whether a trustee is following any 
general investment guidelines established by the reporting individual. 
3. Expand Disclosure of Blind Trust Assets to Promote Citizen 
Oversight 
Additional changes should be made to facilitate public oversight of 
potential conflicts of interest.  Because a reporting individual apparently 
is not required to report on each financial disclosure statement the 
identity of assets known still to be in the trust, citizen oversight is 
extraordinarily cumbersome.  The rules should require reporting 
individuals to list on their annual financial disclosure statements any 
asset held by a qualified blind trust that they know is still in the trust. 
One of the significant innovations of the 1978 Ethics in Government 
Act authorizing blind trusts is that it refused to consider assets that the 
grantor initially placed in the trust to be truly blind.138  Prior blind trusts 
                                                     
 135. Most states have adopted statutes authorizing the states Attorney General to enforce 
charitable trusts, but others have established this duty through judicial decisions.  MARION R. 
FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND 
REGULATIONS 30507 (2004).  The problem of enforcing a charitable trust is analogous to concerns 
regarding oversight of a trustees actions under a blind trust.  Because the beneficiaries of a 
charitable trust are the public at large, there is no specific person to function like the self-interested 
beneficiary of a private trust.  Id. at 301.  Accordingly, the government, represented by the Attorney 
General, exercises oversight of charitable trusts by invoking its parens patriae power.  Id. 
 136. While likely to present political problems, this idea may not pose a separation of powers 
problem because the Attorney General would be monitoring the trustees rather than monitoring an 
independent branch of government. 
 137. For executive branch qualified blind trusts, the Office of Government Ethics has such 
investigatory power, as well as the power to revoke the certification of a trust as a qualified blind 
trust.  5 C.F.R. § 2634.503 (2007). 
 138. SENATE BLIND TRUST REPORT, supra note 56, at 13. 
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were deemed blind the day after the trust was established despite the fact 
that the trust obviously contained the same investments placed in it by 
the government official.139  Instead, the new rules required the grantor to 
disclose the initial assets to a supervising ethics office, which would then 
be subject to public scrutiny.140   
This treatment of initial assets continues.  Policymakers who 
establish qualified blind trusts must submit to the supervising ethics 
office a list of the assets initially transferred into the trust, along with the 
category of the assets value (not the actual value).141  These lists of 
initial blind trust assets are available to the public on request.142  
Apparently, however, the public official need not disclose the identity of 
these known assets on an annual financial disclosure form.143  Because 
the list of initial assets is a public record, there is no obligation to 
specifically identify them on a public financial disclosure report 
annually.144  When a trustee sells all or most of an initial asset, he must 
notify the public official and the supervising ethics office of the assets 
sold, unless all of the initial assets were well-diversified.145  These 
notices of sale are also available to the public.146 
Thus, in order for a citizen to determine whether a policymaker has a 
potential conflict of interest where a blind trust is involved, the citizen 
first must request, and likely pay a fee to obtain, a financial disclosure 
statement, from which he learns that a policymaker has established a 
blind trust.147  It does not, however, indicate whether all of the 
                                                     
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 14. 
 141. 5 U.S.C. app. § 102(f)(5)(A)(ii) (2000). 
 142. Id. § 102(f)(5)(D). 
 143. See supra notes 68, 11, 45 and accompanying text.  Senator Frist knew that his blind trusts 
held HCA stock, yet did not list these assets as belonging to the trust on his financial disclosure 
report.  In fact, Senator Frist maintained on his public financial disclosure form that he did not know 
the identity of the underlying assets held by his blind trusts.  See supra notes 68, 11.   
 144. Telephone conversation with Katja Eichinger, Counsel, Senate Select Comm. on Ethics 
(Feb. 23, 2007). 
 145. 5 U.S.C. §§ 102(f)(3)(C)(iii), 102(f)(4)(B)(i). 
 146. Id. § 102 (f)(5)(D). 
 147. The cost of Senator Frists 2006 Financial Disclosure Statement was $5.00.  Watchdog 
organizations have posted some older forms on the Internet, but these might not reflect any 
amendments that a reporting individual made to those forms.  According to the Senate Office of 
Public Records, each page copied and produced is twenty cents.  Telephone conversation with 
Pamela Gavin, Pub. Records Superintendent, Senate Office of Pub. Records (Feb. 23, 2007).  House 
of Representatives disclosure forms and some blind trust documents may be printed directly from a 
database located at the Legislative Resource Center for ten cents a page.  Author visit to Legislative 
Res. Ctr. (Apr. 26, 2007).  The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 requires that 
financial disclosure reports of Members of the House be posted on the Clerks website beginning no 
later than August 1, 2008.  Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-81 § 
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individuals assets initially placed in the trust have been sold or 
otherwise disposed of.  For this information, a citizen must request, and 
pay to obtain, the list of assets initially placed in the trust. While this 
process may be direct in some instances, blind trust agreements that 
include a list of initial assets are purged after six years from the House of 
Representatives public data base.148  Finally, the citizen must request all 
of the trustees reports of assets that have been transferred out of the trust 
for every year the blind trust has existed, again paying a fee for every 
record obtained.  Even with all of this information, a citizen does not 
know whether the trust holds assets that the supervising ethics office has 
authorized the trustee to keep in the trust.149 
Requiring annual disclosure of known blind trust assets would more 
completely fulfill the spirit of the statutory mandate that an initial asset 
shall be considered a financial interest of the reporting individual, for 
the purposes of any applicable conflict of interest statutes, regulations, or 
rules of the Federal Government (including section 208 of title 18, 
United States Code), until such time as the reporting individual is 
notified by the trustee that such asset has been disposed of, or has a value 
of less than $1,000.150  To treat the asset as a financial interest would 
be to disclose its identity annually, as required for other financial 
interests.151  Annual disclosure would comport more closely with the way 
                                                                                                                       
304, 121 Stat. 735, 75253, available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi? 
dbname=110_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ081.110.pdf. 
 148. The Legislative Resource Center, under the auspices of the Office of the Clerk of the U.S. 
House of Representatives, maintains publicly available documents for the House.  This author 
visited the Legislative Resource Center and was not able to retrieve certain blind trust documents 
from that office because they had been destroyed, pursuant to a policy to purge financial disclosure 
documents after six years.  Interview with Janice Glosson, Registration and Compliance Clerk, 
Legislative Res. Ctr., Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, in Wash., D.C. (Apr. 26, 
2007). 
 149. A citizen could identify that a restricted asset remains in the trust by comparing the list of 
initial assets and the notices of sale subsequently received in the ethics office.  But simply knowing 
that the trust retains an asset is not enough information to determine whether the asset poses a 
conflict of interest.  The fact that the reporting individual specifically sought to keep the asset in the 
trust may raise a more significant specter of a conflict.  The policymakers attachment to the asset 
might point to a potential conflict of interest regarding a related decision. 
 150. 5 U.S.C. § 102(f)(4)(A). 
 151. At least one state that authorizes the use of blind trusts to avoid public financial disclosure 
requires annual disclosure of initial assets remaining in the trust.  California requires public officials 
to disclose investments and interests in real property, as well as the value category and sources of 
income.  CAL. GOV. CODE §§ 8720087203 (West 2005).  An interest in a blind trust need not be 
disclosed if those interests or investments are acquired by the trustee after the trust complies with 
subsection (b).  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2 § 18235(a) (2000) (emphasis added).  Section (b) requires 
that a blind trust be established with a disinterested trustee with complete discretion who is 
prohibited from disclosing information concerning the replacement assets.  Tit. 2 § 18235(b)(1)
(4) (2000).  The California Fair Political Practices Commission further clarifies that you must 
disclose reportable assets originally transferred into the blind trust and income from those original 
 
08 - BALLARD FINAL II.DOC 12/10/2007  1:40:20 PM 
78 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
in which the original drafters of the qualified blind trust rules envisioned 
that these initial assets would be treated.  Indeed, the Senate report on the 
Ethics in Government bill states that, [d]uring that transition [between 
the time a trust is established and the time a trustee transfers the initial 
assets], the public interest in knowing that financial conflicts of interests 
do not exist is satisfied by financial disclosure.152 
Citizen oversight would also be enhanced if the Ethics in 
Government Act was amended to reflect a more functional approach to 
the identification of people who must comply with financial disclosure 
obligations.153  Currently, the Ethics in Government Act requires that an 
official compelled to disclose financial assets must also include those of 
his spouse and dependent children.154  This group of individuals is too 
narrow.  No disclosure is required, for example, for dependent parents or 
parents-in-law, or unmarried partners.  Consequently, the financial 
interests of these individuals need not be disclosed despite the fact that 
such interests may impair a policymakers impartial judgment. 
The circle of those required to report should be broadened to include 
dependents and members of a reporting individuals immediate family, 
not just a spouse or dependent child.  Alaskas statutes governing 
standards of conduct define immediate family in a manner that would 
more securely identify financial conflicts, and could be applied to federal 
officials required to disclose their financial interests.  In Alaska, a 
persons immediate family includes a spouse or domestic partner.155  
Immediate family member encompasses parents, children (including 
stepchildren and adopted children) and siblings who reside with, are 
financially dependent on, or share a substantial financial interest with the 
person.156 
                                                                                                                       
assets until they have been disposed of by the trustee.  CAL. FAIR POLITICAL PRACTICES COMMN, 
2006/2007 FORM 700 STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTERESTS REFERENCE PAMPHLET 15 (2006), 
available at http://www.fppc.ca.gov/forms/700-06-07/refpamphlet06-07.pdf. 
 152. SENATE BLIND TRUST REPORT, supra note 56, at 14 (emphasis added). 
 153. Specifically, §§ 102(e)(1), (f)(1), (f)(2)(C), and (e)(3) of Title 5 app. of the U.S. Code 
should be amended. 
 154. 5 U.S.C. app. § 102(e)(f) (2000). 
 155. ALASKA STAT. § 24.60.990(a)(6)(A) (2004).  A domestic partner is a person who is 
cohabiting with another person in a relationship that is like a marriage but that is not a legal 
marriage.  ALASKA STAT. § 24.60.990(a)(5) (2004).  Alaska, however, does not require everyone in 
a policymakers immediate family to disclose financial information.  Instead, certain 
policymakers, their spouses or domestic partners, dependent children, and (for legislators) 
nondependent children living with the policymaker must disclose.  Act of July 9, 2007, ch. 47, sec. 
43, § 24.60.200, 2007 Alaska Adv. Legis. Serv. 47 (LexisNexis) (governing legislators); ALASKA 
STAT. § 39.50.030 (2004) & Act of July 9, 2007, ch. 47, secs. 55, 56, §§ 39.50.030(b), (h), 2007 
Alaska Adv. Legis. Serv. 47 (LexisNexis) (governing judicial officers and the executive branch). 
 156. ALASKA STAT. § 24.60.990(a)(6)(B) (2004). 
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Some might reason that the entire purpose for blind trusts is to 
absolve citizens of monitoring responsibilities.  In theory, the blind trust 
is a replacement for citizen oversight.  From this perspective, it should 
not matter if monitoring is difficult.  Nonetheless, because an official 
with a blind trust knows the identity of his initial assets and the assets a 
trustee is prevented from transferring, some outside monitoring is still in 
order, as the situation with Senator Frists HCA stock illustrates.  
Requiring annual disclosure of assets that a reporting individual knows to 
be held in a blind trust will facilitate citizen oversight, as will taking a 
more realistic approach to determining who must comply with reporting 
duties. 
4. Impose Additional Penalties 
Enhancing the penalties related to violating blind trust rules will 
strengthen the blindness provisions and discourage policymakers from 
inappropriately hiding behind a blind trust that may not truly be blind.  
Blind trust rules should impose a fine on a reporting individual who 
publicly issues a statement disavowing knowledge of assets held in a 
blind trust when the individual knows or has reason to know of those 
assets.  The current Ethics in Government Act authorizes civil and 
criminal sanctions against anyone who knowingly and willfully falsifies 
a financial disclosure report.157  The Act, however, does not penalize 
reporting individuals for publicly misrepresenting their knowledge of 
assets held by a blind trust.  The absence of a penalty for such 
misrepresentation allows a reporting individual to perpetuate the myth of 
blindness even though the underlying initial assets are still quite visible 
to the policymaker.158 
It is possible that such false statements could already be considered 
unlawful under the federal statute criminalizing false statements.159  
However, while the statute has been applied to false statements made on 
                                                     
 157. Civil penalties are authorized under 5 U.S.C.S. app. § 104(a) (LEXIS through Pub. L. 110-
83 (Sept. 20, 2007)).  The recent Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 added a 
criminal sanction.  See supra note 81. 
 158. See, e.g., public statements that Senator Frist made, supra notes 910 and accompanying 
text. 
 159. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000).  To constitute a violation, the false statement made directly or 
indirectly to the government must relate to any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, 
legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States.  § 1001(a).  Jurisdiction is 
bestowed by any statutory basis for the agencys access to the information and is present wherever a 
false statement relates in some way to a matter in which a federal agency has the power to act.  
Jennifer L. Kraft & David A. Sadoff, Ninth Survey of White Collar Crime: False Statements, 31 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 539, 55960 (1994) (footnote omitted). 
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a financial disclosure report,160 it might be a stretch to apply it to a 
policymakers statement to the press regarding his knowledge (or lack 
thereof) of assets held in a blind trust that is reported on a financial 
disclosure report.  If this false statements statute would not apply, the 
elements of a fraudulent misrepresentation claim could track those of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 526.161 
Given the strong incentive to remove the blindfold from blind trust 
beneficiaries, the Ethics in Government Act should also include criminal 
liability for a trustee or reporting individuals knowing and willful 
violation of blind trust rules related to disclosing or seeking information.  
The draft ethics bill approved in 1977 by the Senate did call for criminal 
sanctions of up to one year imprisonment for a knowing and willful 
violation.162  Congress eliminated this in the final version passed in 
1978.163  The specter of criminal liability would strengthen the resolve of 
a trustee and reporting individual to comply with qualified blind trust 
rules seeking to limit the flow of information between them.164  
Moreover, adding a criminal penalty would be consistent with 
Congresss recent bolstering of civil and criminal penalties for other 
ethics rules violations.165 
                                                     
 160. See, e.g., United States v. Espy, 989 F. Supp. 17, 23 (D.D.C. 1997), revd in part on other 
grounds, 145 F.3d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (violation of Ethics in Government Act by making false 
statements on financial disclosure was basis for criminal charges under 18 U.S.C. § 1001). 
 161. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states: 
A misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker (a) knows or believes that the matter is not 
as he represents it to be, (b) does not have the confidence in the accuracy of his 
representation that he states or implies, or (c) knows that he does not have the basis for 
his representation that he states or implies. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1977). 
 162. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 163. However, criminal liability follows where an executive branch employee has a conflict of 
interest and there is a causal link between [the] particular Government matter in which the 
employee participates and [the] effect on the [employees] asset or other interest (direct effect).  
There must be a real possibility of gain or loss as a result of development in or resolution of that 
matter (predictable effect).  REVIEWERS REFERENCE, supra note 31, at 5-1 (citing United States v. 
Gorman, 807 F.2d 1299, 1303 (6th Cir. 1986); 5 C.F.R. §§ 2635.402, 2640.103). 
 164. Congress recently added a criminal sanction for any person who knowingly and willfully 
falsifies information required under the Ethics in Government Act reporting obligations of § 102.  
See supra note 81.  While this will deter false assertions on documents that a trustee and reporting 
individual must file, it will do nothing to deter unauthorized communication. 
 165. The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 increased civil fines and added 
criminal sanctions for failure to comply with lobbying disclosure requirements.  Honest Leadership 
and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-81 § 211, 121 Stat. 735, 749, available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ0 
81.110.pdf.  Similarly, it increased civil fines and added a criminal penalty for knowing and willful 
falsification of information an individual is required to report under § 102 of the Ethics in 
Government Act.  Id. § 702, 121 stat. at 77576. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Policymakers began to use blind trusts as a means of avoiding full 
disclosure, in some instances, of assets that a policymaker was unwilling 
to divest.  The lack of uniform standards governing blind trusts 
compelled Congress to debate the devices merit and conclude that it was 
valuable if properly regulated.  Thirty years of regulation under the 
Ethics in Government Act is sufficient to determine whether blind trusts 
adequately insulate governmental decisions from decision-makers 
financial interests.  While blind trusts may allow some individuals with 
wealth and privacy concerns to engage in public service when they might 
otherwise have been discouraged from doing so by financial disclosure 
rules, the potential loss of integrity in decision-making does not 
counterbalance this advantage.  Perhaps it is time to place more value on 
the sanctity of the decision-making process and determine if full 
disclosure unacceptably sacrifices a broad pool of talented public 
servants.  In the interim, while this alternative approach is debated, 
Congress must strengthen the qualified blind trust rules so that the device 
can deter financial conflicts of interest and enhance public confidence in 
the integrity of decision-making. 
 
